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Desegregration in Higher Education: The
Limits of a Judicial Remedy
GIL KuJOVICHt
During the era of de jure segregated public education, dis-
crimination against black students was not confined to elementary
and secondary schools. Under the protective mantle of Plessy v.
Ferguson,' the segregationist states rigidly enforced racial separa-
tion in their public institutions of higher education. The Supreme
Court's earliest decisions questioning the manner in which the
states afforded separate but equal public education concerned
state colleges and universities. As early as 1938, the Court began to
refine the constitutional mandate of equality required of states
that operated racially separate colleges.2 Within twelve years, the
Court decided three additional higher education cases3 that fore-
shadowed its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education.4
Despite this early focus on colleges, for nearly four decades
after Brown the Court paid scant attention to desegregation in
higher education.5 In the absence of guidance from the Supreme
t Professor, Vermont Law School. J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Vic-
toria Cherney for her thorough research, skilled editing, and kind support.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Brown 1).
2. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (invalidating out-of-state
scholarships as means of providing equality in graduate education).
3. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. In the mid-1950s the Court issued two per curiam decisions holding that Brown Ps
invalidation of racial segregation applied to colleges and universities, Board of Trustees v.
Frasier, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam), summarily afl'g 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C.
1955), and that there was "no reason for delay" in the admission of black students to white
colleges, Florida ex rel Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956). More than a
decade later, the Court briefly revisited the issue by summarily affirming two lower court
decisions that reached seemingly conflicting conclusions as to the permissibility of ex-
panding white college facilities in close proximity to black institutions. Board of Visitors v.
Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971), summarily afg Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F.
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Court, the lower federal courts struggled with the questions of
whether and how constitutional remedies developed for the deseg-
regation of elementary and secondary schools applied to segregated
public colleges.' In 1992, the Court ended its forty years of near
silence and decided a case challenging Mississippi's failure to dis-
mantle its formerly de jure segregated system of public higher ed-
ucation. United States v. Fordice7 outlined the remedial steps that
Mississippi, and other states that operated racially separate col-
leges and universities, must take to comply with the Constitution.
Addressing only the broad remedial requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court left the details of a constitutionally
acceptable remedy to the consideration of the lower courts.
Subsequent to Fordice, federal district and appellate courts in
Mississippi,' Alabama,9 and Louisiana ° have attempted to apply
the Fordice remedial standard and to fashion specific remedies for
the continuing effects of past segregation in state colleges and uni-
versities. A full understanding of the extent to which Fordice will
succeed in achieving desegregation in public higher education must
await the Court's review of cases implementing its 1992 decision
and its further refinement of the remedial principles the decision
established.
What is already evident, however, is that the Court crafted for
higher education a desegregation remedy much more limited than
Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971); Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Sch. & College
Auth., 393 U.S. 400 (1969) (per curiam), aff'g 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981), 692 F. Supp.
642 (1988), 718 F. Supp. 499 (1989), 718 F. Supp. 525 (1989); United States v. Alabama, 628
F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ala. 1985), rev'd, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Board of Trustees of Ala. State Univ. v. Auburn Univ., 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); Knight v.
Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968), Geier v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573 (1972), 427 F. Supp. 644 (1977), afl'd, Geier v.
University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979), Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d 1078
(1979), cert. denied sub nom. University of Tenn. v. Geier, 444 U.S. 886 (1979), Geier v.
Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (1984), aff'd, 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986).
7. 505 U.S. 717 (1992). Justice White delivered an opinion for the Court joined by all
other Justices except Justice Scalia. Concurring opinions were written by Justice O'Connor,
id. at 743, and Justice Thomas, id. at 745. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part. Id. at 749.
8. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Miss. 1995). The district court's first opin-
ion in the case was issued in 1987. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987),
afl'd, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717
(1992). The 1987 judgment was reversed by a Fifth Circuit three judge panel. Ayers v. Al-
lain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit, rehearing en banc, affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court and reversed itself. Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990).
9. Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994), 900 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
10. United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1993), vacating in part, rev'g in
part, and remanding 811 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. La. 1992).
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that which has evolved over the past forty years in the context of
elementary and secondary schools. Most importantly for the pur-
poses of this Article, the remedial principles announced in Fordice
implicitly threaten the achievement of racial equality in higher ed-
ucation. The failure of Fordice to ensure that a desegregation rem-
edy effectively serves the goal of educational equality determines
the primary focus of this Article: to consider an alternative to judi-
cially defined, constitutional remedies for segregation and discrimi-
nation in public higher education. Specifically, I consider the reme-
dial authority delegated by Congress to the Executive Branch in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11
Using Mississippi as the primary example, Part I reviews the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation resulting from the
operation of racially separate systems of public higher education.
As is evident from even a brief look at the history of segregated
colleges and universities, the educational opportunities afforded to
black citizens in the segregationist states were not only racially
separate, but also unequal. Part II discusses what Fordice defines
as the constitutionally acceptable remedy for past segregation and
examines the adequacy of that remedy in eliminating the effects of
long-lasting racial discrimination in public higher education.
Because Fordice has limited the scope of constitutionally
based remedies fashioned by the federal courts, the potentially
broader, administrative remedial power available under Title VI
becomes a central issue in the continuing struggle for racial equal-
ity in higher education. Part III examines two perspectives on the
reach of Title VI. First, it considers whether the statute's prohibi-
tion of discrimination in federally funded programs extends be-
yond the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Second, it explores the possibility of using the Title
VI enforcement process to address constitutional violations not in-
cluded in the Fordice analysis.
While the conception of the Title VI violation is an important
factor in determining the reach of Executive Branch authority to
devise remedies for discrimination in higher education, it is not the
only consideration. Part IV examines the additional question of
the character of judicial and administrative remedial powers to
suggest that administrative remedies under Title VI need not be as
limited as those developed by the courts.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 2000d-7 (1988).
1996]
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
HIGHER EDUCATION
There can be no doubt that in providing publicly supported
higher education to its citizens, the State of Mississippi violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of equal protection.
The state's unconstitutional discrimination against its black citi-
zens took two forms. First, Mississippi operated rigidly segregated
colleges and universities in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause as interpreted in Brown. Second, during the period in which
Plessy interpreted the Constitution to permit racially separate
public facilities if equal provision were made for blacks and whites,
the state consistently failed to provide equal educational opportu-
nity to its black citizens. The vestiges of both forms of unconstitu-
tional discrimination are evident today in Mississippi's system of
public higher education and continue to adversely affect the educa-
tion of the state's black citizens.
Mississippi strictly enforced racial segregation in its colleges
and universities from the time it opened its first public university.
During the nineteenth century the state legislature established
three institutions reserved for the higher education of white stu-
dents only: University of Mississippi (1848), Mississippi State Uni-
versity (1880), and Mississippi University for Women (1885). In
that same period the state created one institution for the educa-
tion of black youths: Alcorn State University (1871). Two addi-
tional white colleges were established in the early twentieth cen-
tury: University of Southern Mississippi (1912) and Delta State
University (1925). After the constitutionality of segregated higher
education was challenged in the federal courts, Mississippi added
two more black institutions to its system of higher education: Jack-
son State University (1940) and Mississippi Valley State Univer-
sity (1950).12 Throughout the century before Brown, the state
strictly enforced the barriers of racial separation. All eight public
institutions were racially identified by their student bodies, facul-
ties, and staffs.13
The state continued its policy of segregation after Brown. 4 It
was not until 1962 that the first black student, James Meredith,
was admitted to a white public college in Mississippi, and then
only under court order and with the protection of federal troops."
12. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 721-22.
13. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1529.
14. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 722.
15. State officials engaged in "a carefully calculated campaign of delay, harassment, and
masterly inactivity" to prevent Meredith's enrollment in the University of Mississippi. Mer-
[Vol. 44
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Even after Meredith's admission, "the segregated public university
system in the State remained largely intact."16 The white institu-
tions failed to employ any black faculty until the 1970s,11 at which
time the student bodies of all eight colleges remained "almost ex-
clusively single-race."'" Racial segregation remained at the time of
trial in Fordice. In the mid-1980s, thirty years after Brown, the
five institutions the State had created for white students remained
predominantly white and the three colleges founded for black stu-
dents remained predominantly black.1 9
De jure segregation was not the only equal protection viola-
tion that Mississippi inflicted on its black population. For more
than eighty years after Alcorn State began educating black stu-
dents, Mississippi violated Plessy's constitutional command that
racially separate colleges be equal. Tangible and extreme inequal-
ity in public higher education was most obvious in the number of
institutions the state provided for whites and blacks. After Alcorn
State opened in 1871, the state expanded its system of white col-
leges to include five institutions. Alcorn State, however, remained
the only public college available to black citizens until 1940.20 Dur-
ing that time, enrollment at Alcorn State was limited to fewer than
500 students.21
For nearly a century, racial discrimination in violation of
Plessy was evident in the inadequate funding, inferior facilities,
and severely restricted educational programs at the public colleges
serving Mississippi's black citizens.2 2 As late as 1940, the state's
edith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962). All three
branches of the state government joined the effort to defy the Fifth Circuit's order that
Meredith be admitted. Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 586, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1962). Consequently,
President Kennedy used U.S. Marshals and armed forces to ensure compliance with the
court order. United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1963). After enrolling,
"Meredith carried on his studies under continuous guard until his graduation." United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 686 (1964).
16. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 722.
17. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1529.
18. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 723.
19. Id. at 724-25.
20. Id. at 721-22.
21. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419, 1438 n.54 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
22. The scale of inequality in the early years is evident in a comparison of the funding
of the state's black and white land grant colleges. Consistent with the practice of all the
segregationist states, Mississippi created two land grant colleges: Alcorn State for blacks
and Mississippi State for whites. See Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education
and the Black Public College: The Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. Rav. 29, 40-44
(1987) (establishment of segregated land grant colleges). These two institutions received
state and federal funding for the land grant functions of resident instruction, research, and
extension work. See id. at 45-64 (review of land grant functions in racially segregated
colleges).
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expenditures for the higher education of the black half of its popu-
lation 23 was a mere five percent of its expenditures for its white
citizens.24 The two black institutions had a full-time faculty of 43
persons while the white colleges operated with a faculty of nearly
800.25 Students enrolled at the two black colleges could choose
from only 23 programs at the undergraduate level and none at the
graduate level. The state afforded its white students a choice of
more than 115 undergraduate, graduate, and professional fields.26
All five of the white public colleges were accredited. There was no
fully accredited public college available to black students.27
Extreme racial discrimination continued in the years just prior
to Brown. Between 1947 and 1953, average annual educational ex-
penditures at each of Mississippi's five white public colleges were
more than twice that at each of the two black public colleges. 28
In 1928, total funding for land grant operations at Alcorn was a mere $80,676, less than
one-tenth of the land grant funding provided to Mississippi State. 1 OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, 1930 BULL. No. 9, SURVEY OF LAND GRANT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
101, 106-07 (1930) [hereinafter LAND GRANT SURVEY]; 2 id. at 856. Consistently unequal
funding produced unequal facilities. The value of facilities and property at Mississippi State
was more than three million dollars. 1 id. at 134. Alcorn was valued at just over $500,000. 2
id. at 869. Alcorn's science facilities were "almost entirely of secondary grade" and the insti-
tution lacked both "a properly qualified teaching staff and educational equipment for stan-
dard college work." BUREAU OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, 1928 BULL. No. 7, SURVEY OF
NEGRO COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 416, 417 (1929) [hereinafter NEGRO COLLEGE SURVEY].
Inadequate funding was matched by an inadequate educational program. More than
half a century after Alcorn was founded, and when it was the only public college for black
students, it was "largely a school of secondary grade ... in which the greater part of the
work [was] concentrated in industrial and manual training. Courses [were] offered in laun-
dering, carpentry, blacksmithing, horseshoeing, wagon and carriage building, painting, shoe-
making, and domestic science." Id. at 405. In 1928, eighty percent of Alcorn's students were
below the college level. See 2 LAND GRANT SURVEY, supra, at 896-97. The college had a
faculty of twelve persons, only three of whom were devoted exclusively to higher education.
All but one had only a bachelor's degree. NEGRO COLLEGE SURVEY, supra, at 413.
23. In 1940, blacks constituted 49% of the population of Mississippi. BUREAU OF CEN-
SUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES; Colonial Times
to 1970 30 (Bicentennial ed. 1975).
24. In 1940, Mississippi's educational and general expenditures at its black public col-
leges was approximately $161,000; at the state's white public colleges the sum was more
than three million dollars. 6 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUC., HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 46 (1947) (tbl. 44).
25. Id. at 36 (tbl. 33).
26. 2 FED. SEC. AGENCY, U.S. OFFICE OF EDUC., NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE HIGHER EDUCA-
TION OF NEGROES: GENERAL STUDIES OF COLLEGES FOR NEGROES 10, 14-15 (1942).
27. Id. at 16.
28. The white institutional average was one million dollars per year; at the black col-
leges the institutional average was less than $400,000 annually. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, INST. OF
HIGHER LEARNING, HIGHER EDUCATION IN MISSISSIPPI 335-36 (John E. Brewton, Survey Dir.
1954) [hereinafter BREWTON REPORT]. This document is the report of a committee appointed
by the Board of Trustees for Mississippi's colleges and universities. Id. at vii. The average
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Although a 1945 state study of higher education recommended im-
provement in the substandard and inadequate facilities at Missis-
sippi's black public colleges,29 racially discriminatory funding for
facilities continued. From 1945 to 1953, black public colleges re-
ceived only thirteen percent of state expenditures on plant and fa-
cilities.3 ° Nearly a century of acute, state-imposed discrimination
firmly established inequality in the facilities of the colleges at-
tended by black students.3"
Discrimination and inequality in the years just prior to Brown
also involved faculty and educational programs. In 1953, the three
black institutions employed a total of five persons with doctorate
degrees, a mere three percent of the faculty at those colleges as
compared with twenty-two percent of the much larger white col-
lege faculties.3 2 In the early 1950s, Mississippi restricted its black
institutions to the three educational functions that characterized
separate and unequal black colleges in all the segregationist states:
training of elementary and secondary teachers, agriculture and
home economics, and low-grade vocational education.3 3 Conse-
quently, Alcorn State, Jackson State, and Mississippi Valley State
offered their undergraduate black students educational opportuni-
ties that fell far short of those available to white students.3 4
Graduate and professional education was simply not available
given excludes Mississippi Valley State, which became a black public college after 1950.
Inclusion of that institution would increase the disparity since Mississippi Valley's total
expenditures did not exceed $200,000 prior to 1953. Id. at 344.
29. Id. at 134-35 (quoting BOARD OF TRUSTEES, INST. OF HIGHER LEARNING, MIssIssIPPI
STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 335-36 (Joseph E. Gibson, Survey Dir. 1945)).
30. Id. at 251.
31. The cumulative effects of long lasting discrimination were particularly evident in
the libraries of the institutions. In 1953, libraries at Mississippi's three black public colleges
held less than seven percent of the volumes in all public college libraries. The black college
libraries ranged from a low of 2,000 volumes to a high of 19,800; at the white institutions the
libraries held from 33,000 to 184,000 volumes. Id. at 239, 335-36. The "separate but equal"
library at Alcorn State was housed on the second floor of a classroom building, difficult to
use at night because of insufficient lighting, and lacked adequate shelving. Id. at 232-33.
Jackson State's library was inadequate for its educational program. Id. at 235. At Missis-
sippi Valley, "equality" of library facilities was achieved by shelving 2,000 volumes in a
classroom. Id. at 239. Meanwhile, two of the white institutions added million dollar library
facilities to their already superior physical plants. Id. at 212, 223.
32. Id. at 293. At all faculty levels, the state discriminated in salaries. Id. at 148. For
example, faculty at the black land grant college received approximately three-fourths the
salary paid to faculty at the same level at the white land grant college. Id. at 292.
33. Id. at 144; see generally Kujovich, supra note 22, at 65-81, 104-06 (discussing cur-
ricula at segregated public colleges).
34. For Fall 1953, undergraduate education at the three black colleges totaled 321
courses; at the white institutions the total was 1,460. BREWTON REPORT, supra note 28, at
331-34.
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to black students in Mississippi. 5 White students were more fortu-
nate. Three of the white public colleges offered opportunities to
earn graduate degrees, including a limited number of Ph.D. pro-
grams." White students, but not black students, had access to
Mississippi's schools of medicine, engineering, business, pharmacy,
and forestry.3 7 For its black population, Mississippi provided grad-
uate and professional opportunities through a severely limited out-
of-state scholarship fund,3 8 a practice the Supreme Court had in-
validated fifteen years earlier.39
As found by the district court in Fordice, higher education in
Mississippi was both separate and unequal at the time of Brown.4 °
The effect of long lasting discrimination on the state's black popu-
lation was substantial and far-reaching. At the time of Brown, Mis-
sissippi's black citizens made up forty-five percent of the popula-
tion but received only ten percent of the college degrees awarded
by the state's colleges and universities. 41 Because segregated ele-
mentary and secondary schools depended on the black colleges for
the education of their teachers, inequality in higher education en-
sured that the next generation of black students would also suffer
the effects of discrimination. In the early 1950s, black secondary
schools employed only one-third the number of teachers found in
the white schools, despite the fact that the black students made up
more than half of the secondary school population. Two-thirds of
the black teachers had no college degree.42
Moreover, the legacy of racial inequality in public higher edu-
cation determined the future of the colleges serving Mississippi's
35. Id. at 148. Although Alcorn State offered a limited summer graduate program in
agriculture, see id. at 112, 331, the Brewton Report described this as "little short of educa-
tional malpractice . . . with the limited resources now available." Id. at 112. The report
cautioned that inadequacies of the black colleges "preclude any serious attempts to develop
among them any programs on the graduate and professional levels." Id. at 157.
36. Id. at 93, 97, 100, 104.
37. Id. at 14-23, 162-63, 178.
38. Even in out-of-state scholarships, white students received more benefits than
blacks. Between 1949 and 1951, the State provided only 16 black students and 111 whites
with opportunities to study out-of-state in the fields of medicine, dentistry, and veterinary
medicine. Id. at 149. In the 1952-1954 biennium, the Mississippi legislature appropriated
only $75,000 for out-of-state study by black students seeking a graduate or professional edu-
cation. Id. at 148-49.
39. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Mississippi did not begin its
out-of-state scholarship program until 1948, ten years after Gaines. Kujovich, supra note 22,
at 119.
40. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1528.
41. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1438. The state's white institutions awarded de-
grees at the rate of one for every 131 white citizens; the black colleges provided a degree to
one of every 778 blacks in the state. BREWTON REPORT, supra note 28, at 149-50.
42. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1437-38.
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black citizens. Just as Brown did not end racial segregation in Mis-
sissippi, neither did it end racially based inequality. While the
state made some improvements in its black public colleges during
the 1950s in an effort to forestall integration,43 the pattern of ine-
quality persisted. During a period of institutional development
that concluded in 1970, Mississippi's white colleges received most
of the funds the state invested in physical plant, faculty positions,
and academic degree programs." The effects of nearly a century of
inequality were evident at the time of trial in Fordice. In the mid-
1980s, the three black institutions were ranked at the bottom of
the state's institutional hierarchy in program offerings, percentage
of faculty with doctorate degrees, expenditures per student, library
volumes, and replacement value of facilities. 45 At a time when two-
thirds of the black students in the state's system of higher educa-
tion were enrolled in black colleges, 46 the quality of education pro-
vided to those students showed the effects of discrimination. A re-
view of programs below the doctoral level found that seventy-five
percent of the "marginal" educational programs were located at
the black institutions. At two of the colleges, approximately half of
all educational programs were classified as marginal.
4 7
It is clear from the historical record that Mississippi practiced
two forms of unconstitutional, racial discrimination in its public
colleges and universities. First, the State enforced a policy of racial
separation that endured for more than a century. Continuing seg-
regation in Mississippi's public colleges is a vestige of that policy.
Second, the State denied its black citizens any measure of educa-
tional equality in its racially separate institutions. The effects of
that long lasting inequality have not been eliminated. The pattern
is not unique to Mississippi, but can be found in most of the segre-
43. Id. at 1452.
44. Id.
45. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 739 n.24, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1990). Of the five white
institutions, the only college that shared the lower rankings with the three black colleges
was Mississippi University for Women, id., which the state planned to close as early as 1985.
Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1489. The well-established pattern of inequality between
the state's black and white land grant colleges, see supra note 22, continued into the 1980s
and 1990s. As recently as 1993, Mississippi appropriated 31 million dollars for research and
extension work at its white land grant university; the black land grant received only
$372,000 in state funds for these land grant functions. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at
1465.
46. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1465.
47. 5 Joint Appendix at 1738, 1748, Ayers v. Mabus, 499 U.S. 958 (1991) (No. 90-6588);
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992). The program review classified a "marginal
program" as one in which "the quality. . . is so poor that changes must be made." 5 Joint
Appendix at 1737. Of the five white colleges, the largest proportion of marginal programs
was 16 percent, at Mississippi University for Women. Id. at 1748.
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gationist states.48 In Fordice, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutional duty to remedy only the first of these constitutional
violations - de jure segregation.
II. UNITED STATES V. FORDICE
The lower courts in Fordice viewed the case as requiring a de-
termination of which of two desegregation remedial approaches
should be applied in the context of higher education. In a long line
of decisions, the Supreme Court has required that unconstitution-
ally segregated elementary and secondary school systems eliminate
the racial identity of their schools. In a more recent case involving
segregation in state-operated youth clubs, the Court announced an
alternative, and more limited, remedial duty. In Fordice, the Court
adopted neither alternative and fashioned a somewhat different
remedy to be used in cases involving formerly segregated systems
of higher education. The compromise struck by the Court, how-
ever, produced a constitutional remedy that may fall far short of
what is necessary to eliminate the effects of past discrimination
and ensure equality of higher educational opportunity.
A. The Fordice Remedy
In Green v. New Kent County Board of Education,49 the
Court imposed upon school boards, which had operated racially
dual elementary and secondary schools, a constitutional "duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary sys-
tem" of public schools. 50 The remedial obligation under Green is
defined largely in terms of the racial characteristics of the schools.
School boards must "convert ... to a system without a 'white'
school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."51 Although the rem-
edy mandated by Green "does not mean that every school in every
community must always reflect the racial composition of the school
system as a whole, ' 52 the remedy obligates school authorities to
"make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation. ' 53 With few exceptions, policies and practices that
48. See, e.g., Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1065-147 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (history
of separate and unequal colleges in Alabama), modified, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). See
generally, Kujovich, supra note 22 (discussing history of separate and unequal colleges in 17
segregationist states).
49. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
50. Id. at 437-38.
51. Id. at 442.
52. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
53. Id. at 26.
[Vol. 44
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impede or simply fail to achieve actual desegregation fall short of
satisfying a school board's remedial duty under the Constitution.
54
In Bazemore v. Friday,5 the Court held that Green's affirma-
tive duty to desegregate did not apply to the "wholly different mi-
lieu" of 4-H Clubs in which membership was not compelled by the
state but was chosen voluntarily by black and white youths.56 In
Bazemore, the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service had
operated racially segregated clubs until 1965. Thereafter, each club
was operated without discrimination and was open to all youths,
regardless of race.57 Although many of the clubs retained their ra-
cial identity, the district court concluded that the racial imbalance
resulted from the "wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of pri-
vate individuals. ' 58 Because the Service had discontinued its dis-
criminatory practices and provided youths with a voluntary choice
of clubs through a racially neutral admissions policy, the Supreme
Court held that the continued existence of single-race clubs did
not violate the Constitution.5
The lower courts in Fordice understandably read Green and
Bazemore as defining different remedial obligations. Under Green,
the constitutional adequacy of a school board's practices and poli-
cies is determined primarily by their results - the duty to deseg-
regate is a duty to eliminate segregation. For state services in
which participation is not compelled and in which a free choice of
facility is permitted, Bazemore appeared to shift the remedial fo-
cus from the result of state practices to their racial neutrality. The
continuing racial identifiability of the youth clubs was constitu-
tionally irrelevant as long as the state provided youths with a vol-
untary choice of clubs. Finding that participation in higher educa-
tion is not state-compelled and that students choose the college
they attend, the lower courts in Fordice looked to Bazemore rather
than Green to define Mississippi's remedial duty. As stated by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: "Mississippi satisfies its constitu-
tional obligation by discontinuing its prior discriminatory practices
and adopting good-faith, race-neutral policies and procedures."6 0
54. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979) (noting that each
failure to convert to unitary system continues the constitutional violation); Wright v. Coun-
cil of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972) (stating that state's actions judged according
to whether they hinder or further desegregation).
55. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
56. Id. at 408. (White, J., concurring). Justice White's opinion on this issue was joined
by four other Justices and was adopted as the reasoning of the Court. Id. at 387-88, 407.
57. Id. at 407.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 408.
60. Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 687 (5th Cir. 1990).
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The Supreme Court, however, analyzed the case differently
and found that neither the Green nor Bazemore remedial duties
could be applied without modification in the context of colleges
and universities. The Court began with the assumption that "Mis-
sissippi had the constitutional duty to dismantle the dual school
system that its laws once mandated" and that "[i]f the State has
not discharged this duty it remains in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the court of
appeals that differences between higher education and elementary
and secondary education called for remedies different from those
crafted in Green:
Unlike attendance at the lower level schools, a student's decision to seek
higher education has been a matter of choice. The State historically has not
assigned university students to a particular institution. Moreover,. . . Mis-
sissippi's institutions of higher learning are not fungible - they have been
designated to perform certain missions. Students who qualify for admission
enjoy a range of choices of which institution to attend.2
Although the characteristic of student choice in higher education
led the Court to reject desegregation remedies such as pupil assign-
ment and school zoning, the Court held that Mississippi did not
cure its constitutional violation of a dual system simply by adopt-
ing a racially neutral admissions policy. As with its rejection of the
Green remedies, the element of student choice was a key factor in
the Court's refusal to endorse Bazemore's more limited remedial
duty:
In a system based on choice student attendance is determined not simply by
admissions policies, but also by many other factors .... [E]ven after a
State dismantles its segregative admissions policy, there may still be state
action that is traceable to the State's prior de jure segregation and that
continues to foster segregation.6 '
Thus, the Court focused on the continuing influence of a state's
past segregative policies in fashioning the remedial obligation that
applies to public systems of higher education:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior system
that continue to have segregative effects - whether by influencing student
enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation in other facets of the uni-
versity system - and such policies are without sound educational justifica-
tion and can be practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its bur-
den of proving that it has dismantled its prior system. Such policies run
61. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 727 (1992).
62. Id. at 729.
63. Id.
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afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, even though the State has abolished
the legal requirement that whites and blacks be educated separately and
has established racially neutral policies not animated by a discriminatory
purpose."'
The Fordice remedial duty is a curious blend of Green and
Bazemore. As in Green, the predicate for remedial action is contin-
uing racial segregation and the remedy is directed only to state ac-
tions that foster segregation. As in Bazemore, however, the Court
did not require that the state eliminate the racial identifiability of
its institutions. A state satisfies the Fordice remedial duty by elim-
inating or modifying certain state policies and practices; it is not
required to convert to a system without white colleges and black
colleges: "That an institution is predominantly white or black does
not in itself make out a constitutional violation."6 5
The possibility that significant segregation might remain after
a state has met its constitutional obligation under Fordice is more
than a hypothetical one. The Fordice remedy does not mandate
the elimination of all state policies and practices that foster or per-
petuate segregation. State actions with a segregative effect are sub-
ject to remedial action only if they are "traceable to" or "rooted
in" the past de jure segregated system.6  Absent this connection to
the past, a policy that perpetuates segregation will survive unless it
is shown to be intentionally discriminatory and therefore an inde-
pendent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 7 Moreover, even
those segregative policies found to be traceable to past segregation
are subject to remedial modification only "to the extent practicable
and consistent with sound educational practices. '6 8 The Court did
64. Id. at 731-32.
65. Id. at 743. See also id. at 746 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[W]e focus on the specific
policies alleged to produce racial imbalance, rather than on the imbalance itself. Thus, a
plaintiff cannot obtain relief merely by identifying a persistent racial imbalance .... -).
Both Bazemore and Fordice failed to consider the influence that racial identifiability can
have on choice. It seems clear that if Mississippi had not enforced racial segregation when it
created its public colleges, it would not today have institutions so sharply identified by the
race of their student bodies. That is, racial identifiability is a vestige of past unconstitu-
tional action. If, as seems likely, a significant number of students choose colleges in which
they will be in the racial majority, that vestige continues to influence student choice and
foster segregation. See id. at 757 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("modern racial imbalance remains a 'vestige' of past segregative practices in
Mississippi's universities, in that the previously mandated racial identification continues to
affect where students choose to enroll - just as it surely affected which clubs students
chose to join in Bazemore").
66. Id. at 729, 743.
67. Id. at 732 n.6.
68. Id. at 729. The Court's opinion includes two slightly different formulations of the
"educational justification" limitation on the remedial duty. The formulation quoted above
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not elaborate on what educational justifications would be suffi-
ciently "sound" to insulate segregative policies from the remedial
duty, nor did it define the limits of "practicability. 69
As to the Mississippi system of higher education, the Court
did identify four policies that appeared to have a continuing segre-
gative effect and that are traceable to past de jure segregation: dif-
ferential admissions standards at black and white institutions,7 0
duplication of programs at black and white colleges,"' variation in
institutional mission assignments, 2 and operation of eight public
suggests that if there are educationally sound alternatives to a suspect policy that have a
lesser segregative effect, the state will not escape its remedial duty merely by establishing
that its existing policy is educationally justified. The practicable and educationally sound
alternative must be adopted. Elsewhere in the majority opinion, however, the Court indi-
cated that segregative policies (traceable to prior de jure segregation) must be reformed if
"such policies are without sound educational justification and can be practicably elimi-
nated." Id. at 731. This formulation suggests that an educationally justified policy need not
be changed even if there are other, less segregative and practicable alternatives.
Courts of appeals reviewing higher education desegregation decisions have reached dif-
ferent resolutions for this apparent inconsistency in the Fordice remedial duty. The Fifth
Circuit has interpreted Fordice to require remedial action for a segregative policy traceable
to the de jure system only when the suspect policy lacks sound educational justification.
United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit has held
that a state is obligated to remedy even educationally justifiable policies if they are tracea-
ble to past segregation and have current segregative effects. Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d
1534, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994). Both courts agree that the availability of a practicable and
educationally sound alternative to the suspect policy limits the scope of the state's remedial
duty. Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1164; Knight, 14 F.3d at 1546.
69. In his characteristically hyperbolic style, Justice Scalia noted the failure of the
Court to elaborate on these terms:
I am not sanguine that there will be comprehensible content to the to-be-defined-
later (and, make no mistake about it, outcome-determinative) notions of "sound
educational justification" and "impracticable elimination." In short, except for the
results that it produces in the present case (which are what they are because the
Court says so), I have not the slightest idea how to apply the Court's analysis -
and I doubt whether anyone else will.
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
70. Automatic admission to Mississippi's five white institutions required an ACT score
of at least 15; the minimum ACT score for automatic admission to the three black institu-
tions was 13. Because nearly three-fourths of the white students and less than one-third of
the black students achieve an ACT score of 15 or better, the differential admissions require-
ments had a segregative effect. Id. at 736-37.
71. A substantial percentage of noncore undergraduate and graduate programs were du-
plicated at Mississippi's black and white public colleges. Id. at 738. Duplicate programs can
foster segregation by providing students with an institutional choice based on the racial
identity of the institutions rather than on their distinct program offerings.
72. During the period of de jure segregation, Mississippi assigned broader academic
missions to its white institutions than to its black colleges. More recent mission assignments
followed, in part, the earlier racially based missions. The Court considered it "likely that the
mission designations interfere with student choice and tend to perpetuate the segregated
1996] DESEGREGATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 15
institutions.7 The Court held that "Mississippi must justify these
policies or eliminate them. ' 74
B. Inadequacy of the Fordice Remedy
Because of the characteristics that distinguish colleges and
universities from elementary and secondary schools, desegregation
remedies in higher education can have unintended but substantial
adverse effects on the educational opportunities available to black
students. While Fordice considered some of these distinguishing
characteristics in rejecting remedial measures used to desegregate
elementary and secondary school systems, the Court's analysis was
incomplete. Consequently, the remedy it adopted fails to achieve
either the desegregation goal of the elementary and secondary
cases or the broader goal of racial equality in higher education.
The inadequacy of Fordice emerges from three characteristics
of the remedy devised by the Court. First, the Fordice remedy is
apparently indifferent to the effect that the modification of segre-
gative policies can have on black educational opportunity. In an
effort to change the racial profile of a state's higher education sys-
tem, the remedy may permit, and even require, states to adopt pol-
icies that reduce the access of black students to colleges and uni-
versities. Second, although Fordice concluded that continuing
racial separation is the touchstone of the remedial duty, the rem-
edy does not demand actual desegregation. It focuses only on seg-
regative policies, the modification of which will not necessarily
yield desegregated institutions. Consequently, some or all of the
state colleges may remain racially identifiable after the state has
fully complied with its remedial obligation. The prospect of contin-
uing segregation, and in particular the segregation of black stu-
dents in black colleges, defines the third problematic aspect of
Fordice. The Court imposed no independent duty on Mississippi,
or the other segregationist states, to remedy the effects of their
past intentionally discriminatory operation of unequal public col-
leges for their black citizens. Continuing inequality between black
and white public colleges is insulated from remedial action absent
a link between that inequality and current segregation. Thus, the
system." Id. at 740-41.
73. Mississippi continues to operate the five white and three black colleges established
prior to Brown. The Court concluded that the existence of eight institutions was a result of
past segregation policies and called for an inquiry into whether retention of all eight colleges
affects student choice and perpetuates segregation. Id. at 741-42.
74. Id. at 733. The Court made clear that its discussion of these four policies was not
intended to foreclose examination of other policies and practices that violate the Fordice
remedial standard. Id.
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decision's most striking contribution to desegregation law may be
its tolerance of state colleges and universities that are both racially
separate and unequal.
1. Distinguishing Characteristics of Higher Education. Tra-
ditionally, the state has provided elementary and secondary
schooling to all citizens; twelve years of education is not only avail-
able to all, it is compelled by state law. Desegregation of an ele-
mentary or secondary school system does not, therefore, result in
the exclusion of any students from that educational opportunity. If
a desegregation remedy displaces students from an all or predomi-
nantly black school, either by closing the school or to make room
for white students, the displaced students are transferred to an-
other school in the system. They do not lose their access to state-
supported education. This is true not only for the students en-
rolled at the time the desegregation remedy is implemented, but
for future generations of students as well. State laws providing for
universal education ensure continuing access for all students, black
and white.
Moreover, the elementary and secondary schools within a
school district are substantially fungible. The assignment of stu-
dents to different schools within a district should not result in sig-
nificant differences in the education they receive. To the extent
that formerly black schools are inferior, desegregation will likely
generate political pressure for school equalization, since white stu-
dents cannot easily choose to attend a school other than the one to
which they have been assigned. Thus, in a desegregated district,
the burden of any disparity of educational opportunity that re-
mains will not fall exclusively on black students.
Public systems of higher education are distinguishable in sev-
eral significant respects. The state does not offer higher education
to all students who might choose to receive it. The state, as well as
the students, makes choices. The state exercises its choice initially
in its decision as to the character of the education each public in-
stitution will offer. As the Fordice Court recognized, "institutions
of higher learning are not fungible - they have been designated to
perform certain missions. ' '7 The state also chooses the number of
students it will educate in its higher education system and who will
receive the limited opportunities available. Budgetary decisions
and enrollment limits define the number of spaces available within
the system and at each institution. Institutional admissions criteria
determine which students are eligible for the educational opportu-
75. Id. at 729.
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nities at each college and which students will be denied a chance to
attend any public college.
Through these and other choices, including decisions on the
location of public colleges and the tuition charged to students, the
state determines who will receive publicly subsidized higher educa-
tion. To the extent that black and white public colleges represent
different policy choices about who will be educated, desegregation
remedies can alter the racial distribution of educational opportu-
nity. If, for example, black public colleges admit students who
would not be eligible for admission at white institutions, desegre-
gation of a black college may result in fewer higher education op-
portunities for black students. This results because the enrollment
of white students in black colleges will not necessarily be matched
by the enrollment of black students in white colleges. Conversely,
if black public colleges offer unequal educational opportunities, as
compared to their white counterparts, the failure to achieve signifi-
cant desegregation within the system can result in continuing dis-
crimination against black students.
Historically, in all the segregationist states, the decision to cre-
ate black public colleges embodied an implicit state policy to pro-
vide advanced education to under-prepared youths who would not
have had that educational opportunity in the absence of segregated
colleges. Rather than resulting from beneficence or generosity, that
implicit policy was compelled by two factors. First, the Fourteenth
Amendment as interpreted in Plessy required that each state make
at least a superficial effort to give its black citizens opportunities
for college education if such opportunities were made available to
whites. Second, the inadequate elementary and secondary school-
ing afforded black youths meant that black public colleges necessa-
rily served many students who were not prepared for higher learn-
ing.76 The policy of providing public higher education to black
students did not, however, produce equal educational opportunity.
During the years that Plessy reigned, public higher education for
blacks consisted primarily of low-level vocational education and
the training of teachers for segregated elementary and secondary
schools. Thus, the policy decisions that produced black public
colleges used public higher education as much to oppress as to ele-
vate the black population, but provided at least some opportunity
76. See Kujovich, supra note 22, at 69-71, 160-62.
77. See id. at 64-81, 104-06. Even in teacher training, the only professional education
afforded in black public colleges before the 1950s, the colleges were not only the product but
also the perpetuators of a separate and unequal society. "Poorly prepared students were
educated in underfunded colleges, by faculty who were victims of discrimination in educa-
tion, to become the teachers of the next generation of college students." Id. at 68.
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for the advanced education of many students who would not other-
wise receive it. 7
8
Black public colleges today continue the tradition of educating
students who would not otherwise be selected by the state for a
college education. In Mississippi, the state's black public colleges
enrolled many students whose low standardized test scores would
not qualify them for admission to the white institutions.79 Compar-
ing a black public college to a nearby white institution, the district
court in Fordice found that the black school had students with
lower average ACT scores, a much larger percentage of freshmen
enrolled in developmental studies, and more of its students receiv-
ing financial aid.80 Consistent with the historical function of such
institutions, the black public college had the de facto mission of
"achieving higher education for educationally under-served blacks
at the lowest possible cost.""' Comparisons of black and white in-
stitutions by the district court in the Alabama higher education
desegregation case showed the same role for that state's black pub-
lic colleges.2
A simple mandate to desegregate does not require and would
not necessarily induce white colleges to assume this and other roles
that black institutions have played in the education of black Amer-
icans.83 For that reason, the remedial power of desegregation has
78. The observations of the district court in the Alabama higher education desegrega-
tion case apply to most of the segregationist states:
Most whites wanted blacks educated, if at all, only to the minimum level neces-
sary to provide semi-skilled labor. Black educational institutions were under the
complete control of white officials who, for the most part, shared the paternalistic
view that black subordination was a natural condition that worked for the better-
ment of both races .... For many years blacks were effectively denied the bene-
fits of a collegiate education by the operation of two interrelated practices: the
uncompromising segregation of the state's white institutions and the limited edu-
cational mission assigned to the state's black colleges. Concomitant to these two
practices, there arose a host of policies and laws designed to institutionalize segre-
gation while assuring the inferior status of black education.
Knight, 787 F. Supp. at 1046.
79. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 734-35 (1992).
80. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1488.
81. Id. at 1491.
82. Knight, 787 F. Supp. 1321-22, 1329-30; see also United States v. Louisiana, 718 F.
Supp. 499, 506-07 (E.D. La. 1989) (finding that whites in state colleges much better pre-
pared than blacks).
83. In Mississippi, as in other segregationist states, black public colleges have been an
important source of employment for black academics. In 1992, Mississippi's three black col-
leges employed over 80 percent of the black faculty in the state's system of higher educa-
tion. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1461. Black public colleges have also played an im-
portant role in the preservation of black culture and history and in the cultural and
intellectual life of the black community. Alex M. Johnson Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United
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been questioned. Some black educators and lawyers have raised se-
rious concerns that the disestablishment of racial duality in col-
leges would foreclose the unique contributions that black colleges
have made, and continue to make, to educational opportunities for
black Americans. These concerns are not new. As early as the
1950s black educators debated the role of the black public college
in a system without segregation compelled by law. Then, as now, a
major concern of that debate was that judicially compelled deseg-
regation would decrease rather than increase black educational
opportunity.8 4
Fordice does little to mitigate that concern. Its remedial ap-
proach calls for constitutional scrutiny, and elimination, of some of
the policies that embody the state's choices in higher education.
The constitutional concern, however, is the segregative effect of
those policies and not their effect on broadening or narrowing
black educational opportunity. The elimination or alteration of
suspect state policies may satisfy the Fordice remedial duty while
at the same time restrict educational opportunity for black stu-
dents. This undesirable, but apparently not unconstitutional, re-
sult can be seen in two of the Mississippi policies that the Court
concluded were constitutionally suspect: different admissions stan-
dards at black and white institutions and the continued operation
of eight public colleges.
2. Disparities in Admissions Standards. Mississippi required
that students seeking admission to public college take the stan-
dardized examination administered by the American College Test-
ing ("ACT") Program. At the time of the trial in Fordice, the ACT
score that qualified a student for automatic admission to the
state's five white colleges was higher than that required at the
three black institutions. 5 Because Mississippi first adopted a re-
States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1401, 1432 (1993); Daryll K. Jones, An Education of Their Own: The Precarious Position of
Publicly Supported Black Colleges After United States v. Fordice, 22 J. L. & EDuc. 485,
514-15 (1993); Kujovich, supra note 22, at 157-58.
84. See Kujovich, supra note 22, at 33-34, 159-62; Mary Ann Connell, The Road to
United States v. Fordice: What Is the Duty of Public Colleges and Universities in Former
De Jure States To Desegregate?, 62 Miss. L. J. 285, 358-59 n.389 (1993) (discussing the
debate among black educators on the role of historically black institutions from the 1930s to
the present).
85. At the time of the first trial in Fordice, the white institutions would not automati-
cally admit any students scoring below 15 on the ACT; the minimum ACT score for auto-
matic admission at the black colleges was 13. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 736 (1992). All eight
institutions permitted some exceptions to their minimum ACT scores, but the exceptions
policy was broader at the black colleges than at the white schools. See Ayers v. Allain, 674
F. Supp. at 1534 (pointing out that the historically white universities may admit up to 5%
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quirement of minimum ACT scores for admission to its white insti-
tutions in the early 1960s, when James Meredith sought admission
to the University of Mississippi,"6 the Supreme Court found that
the disparity in admissions criteria was traceable to de jure segre-
gation. 7 The Court further concluded that the disparity had a cur-
rent segregative effect because the higher minimum score at the
white institutions excluded a larger proportion of black high school
seniors than white seniors.88 Consequently, significant numbers of
black students who did not qualify for admission to the white in-
stitutions were channeled into the black colleges.8" Because the ad-
missions policies were both traceable to past segregation and had a
current segregative effect, Fordice obligates the state to either jus-
tify the disparity in admissions standards or, if practicable, elimi-
nate it.so
The Fordice focus on segregative effect overlooks the role that
admissions criteria can play in expanding educational opportunity.
Variations in admissions requirements among institutions re-
present policy choices by a state as to how broadly it makes educa-
tional opportunity available to its citizens. As noted by the district
court in the Alabama case:
[D]ecisions about whether to admit educationally disadvantaged students to
college who do not score well on the ACT test involve value judgments that
pertain to the purpose and mission of the institution. If the primary concern
of an institution is to enroll students who are likely to be successful aca-
demically without extensive remedial course work, then selection criteria are
necessarily reflective of that. If, on the other hand, the institution is willing
and able to assist educationally disadvantaged students, then its selection
criteria must necessarily reflect its mission."
Although the segregationist states initially adopted the policy of
providing higher education to disadvantaged black students under
of an entering class which scores between 9 and the minimum 15 on the ACT, while the
historically black universities require a minimum score of 13 on the ACT and may draw up
to 10% of its entering class from students scoring between 9 and 12 on the ACT). Moreover,
the white institutions failed to publicize or use admissions exceptions available to them.
Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1434. Subsequent to the trial, and while the case was on
appeal, Mississippi adopted new minimum ACT admission standards. The new criteria in-
creased the minimum score gap between the black and white colleges. See id. at 1431.
86. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1530-31, 1555.
87. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 733-34.
88. Id. at 734-35.
89. In 1985, the ACT score minimum of 15 at the white institutions excluded over 70%
of the state's black high school seniors and only 28% of the white seniors. Id. at 735.
90. Id. at 734-36.
91. Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1156 (N.D. Ala. 1993), modified, 14 F.3d
1534 (11th Cir. 1994).
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the compulsion of Plessy, and implemented that policy in a dis-
criminatory fashion, the policy survives today in black public col-
leges. One of the primary and lasting characteristics of those insti-
tutions is their willingness to assist educationally disadvantaged
students, many of whom do not qualify for admission to the white
institutions.9 2 The district court in Fordice found that the state
had relied on a policy of providing higher education to disadvan-
taged students when, in the mid-1970s, the state decided not to
raise admissions requirements at its black colleges to achieve state-
wide uniformity in admissions standards.9 3
The intermingling of segregative effects with a policy of ex-
panded educational opportunity for black students means that ef-
forts to eliminate or diminish the segregative effect of admissions
criteria can also eliminate or diminish educational opportunity. In
Mississippi, the state could eliminate the disparity in admission
standards by lowering the minimum ACT score at its white schools
or by raising the minimum score at its black public colleges. The
first would expand opportunities available to lower scoring black
applicants; the second would deny those black applicants educa-
tional opportunities currently available to them. A third option,
more effective in desegregating the colleges but also more costly,
would be to transfer the mission of educating under-prepared stu-
dents to the white colleges while providing the black colleges with
sufficient resources to develop quality academic programs that will
attract academically successful students of both races.94
The remedial duty fashioned in Fordice does not appear to
require that the state, or a district court, choose a remedy that will
expand rather than contract black educational opportunity. Nor is
there anything in the Court's opinion that would require Missis-
sippi's white colleges to admit and provide compensatory educa-
92. See supra pp. 23-25; see also SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, PANEL ON EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, REDEEMING THE AMERICAN PROMISE 31
(1995) (noting that black colleges provide access for inadequately prepared students). The
district court in Fordice acknowledged the role of black public colleges in broadening access
to higher education in its discussion of Mississippi Valley State University ("MVSU"):
MVSU consistently has a high percentage of its entering class enrolled in develop-
mental education. Because of the institution's location in one of the poorest re-
gions in the country, MVSU has a high density of academically underprepared
blacks within its service area. Because of this historic fact, MVSU has developed a
strong commitment to serving students from socioeconomic backgrounds which, in
the main, are vastly different from those of the clientele of the other public insti-
tutions of higher learning in the state . ...
Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1491.
93. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1555.
94. Under this approach, there would be a disparity in admissions criteria but the effect
of the disparity would be to desegregate the black and white colleges.
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tion to educationally disadvantaged black students. The segrega-
tive effect of the state's admissions criteria is the constitutional
concern in Fordice, not the educational policies embodied in those
criteria.
On remand, the district court in Mississippi rejected proposals
by the Justice Department and the private plaintiffs to adopt ad-
missions requirements that would broaden the higher educational
opportunities available to black students.9 5 Instead, the court or-
dered implementation of the state's proposal for uniform admis-
sions criteria at a level higher than those used at the black institu-
tions."' Although the incorporation of high school grade point
averages into the new criteria and the possibility of conditional ad-
mission for applicants who do not meet the criteria mitigate the
adverse impact of the uniform standards, the predicted effect of
the remedy ordered by the court will be to decrease the percentage
of black students eligible for admission to Mississippi's public
colleges.9
7
3. Reduction in the Number of Public Colleges. In Fordice,
the Court concluded that the existence of eight institutions in Mis-
sissippi "was undoubtedly occasioned by State laws forbidding the
mingling of the races."98 The conclusion is certainly indisputable.
All the segregationist states increased the number of their colleges
and universities when they created black institutions to serve the
policy of segregation. Both before and after Brown, many states
added new institutions, or branch campuses of their white colleges,
in close proximity to existing black schools with the effect of pro-
viding white students with a geographically accessible alternative
to a black public college.9 In Mississippi, as in the other segrega-
tionist states, the mere existence of black and white colleges pro-
motes segregation by providing black and white students with a
racially based choice of institutions. Thus, eliminating a college, or
merging two institutions with different racial identities, will de-
95. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1481-83.
96. Id. at 1477-78, 1494.
97. Under the admissions criteria used at the time of the district court's decision on
remand, two-thirds of black high school graduates who took the ACT were eligible for ad-
mission to some public college; only half of those black students are eligible under the uni-
form standards ordered by the court. Id. at 1479. However, the new uniform standards in-
crease the pool of black students eligible for admission as compared to the criteria used in
1987. Id.
98. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 741 (1992).
99. See, e.g., Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1541-43; Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp.
1030, 1119-36 (N.D. Ala. 1991), modified, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994); Geier v. University
of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1979).
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crease the segregation profile of the system. The Fordice Court
stopped short of holding that the closure of one or more colleges is
constitutionally required. Instead, it called for a determination on
remand as to whether operation of all eight colleges in Mississippi
perpetuates the segregated system and is educationally justified,
and whether one or more of the schools could practicably be closed
or merged. 10
A Fordice inspired remedy addressed to the constitutionally
suspect policy of operating more institutions than would have ex-
isted in the absence of segregation could have a substantial adverse
effect on black students' opportunities for higher education. The
effect will depend on which institutions are closed. Although the
Fordice majority did not stipulate that black colleges should be
singled out for closure or merger, 10 those institutions are the most
likely candidates for extinction. In Mississippi, as in the other seg-
regationist states, black public colleges have suffered from a cen-
tury-long pattern of unequal funding, inferior facilities, and re-
stricted educational programs.101 Even the white branch campuses
developed by many states after Brown usually received more fund-
ing, better facilities, and more extensive educational programs
than the nearby and much older black public colleges. 03 Thus, a
decision to close a black college, or to merge it into its white coun-
terpart, can usually be justified on both educational and economic
grounds. 10
While the educational and economic costs of closing a black
college will nearly always be less than the costs of closing a white
college, the burden of black college extinction will disproportion-
ately fall on the black population. To the extent that a black col-
lege provides higher education to black students who do not meet
the admission standards of the state's white colleges, the closing of
a black college will promote desegregation of the higher education
100. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 742.
101. Justice Scalia read the Court's opinion differently: "What the Court's test is
designed to achieve is the elimination of predominantly black institutions." Id. at 760
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas contended that the Court did "not foreclose the possibility that there exists 'sound
educational justification' for maintaining historically black colleges as such" in order to bet-
ter serve black students. "I do not understand our opinion to hold that a State is forbidden
from doing so." Id. at 748-49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
102. See supra pp. 6-12; see also Kujovich, supra note 22, at 44-113 (discussing histori-
cal inequalities in funding between black and white public colleges).
103. See, e.g., Knight, 14 F.3d at 1542 (noting that hundreds of millions of dollars were
spent developing white branch campuses in cities where black colleges are located).
104. In addition, the greater political power of the alumni of white institutions will
generally lead a state to propose the closure or merger of a black college rather than a white
one.
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system at the expense of black educational opportunity. Because
neither state law nor the Constitution requires that the state afford
higher education to all students, the state is under no legal duty to
provide for the students who are most affected by institutional clo-
sure. Even if a remedy eliminating a black college includes an op-
portunity for students enrolled at the time of closure to transfer to
other colleges in the system, future generations of black students
will suffer the effects of the remedy. In addition to a likely reduc-
tion of black educational opportunity, the loss of a black college
deprives the black community of other important functions per-
formed by those institutions. 10 5
While the Fordice Court was apparently aware of the threat
institutional closure posed to black educational opportunity, it of-
fered nothing that rises to the level of constitutional principle pro-
tecting against realization of the threat. In a footnote, the majority
observed: "[i]t should be noted" that a 1973 letter from the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare to Mississippi higher
education officials cautioned that closure of a black institution
"would create a presumption that a greater burden is being placed
upon the black students and faculty in Mississippi."'10 Beyond
"noting" this comment, the Court did not endorse it or indicate
what role, if any, it should play in a constitutional remedy.
Absent a clear requirement that the state maintain its com-
mitment to the education of under-prepared black students, the
elimination of black public colleges is a tempting remedial alterna-
tive for states faced with constitutional challenges to racial duality
in their higher education systems. Because the state's constitu-
tional liability and remedial duty under Fordice depend only on
current segregation, and not on a more comprehensive conception
of educational inequality, the closure of black public colleges pro-
vides an expeditious and economically efficient method of satisfy-
ing the remedial duty and escaping further liability. After elimina-
tion of its black colleges, a state system of higher education would
consist of institutions created for white students that enroll some
small percentage of black students. No college in the system would
be racially identifiable and all traces of "segregation" would disap-
pear with the extinction of the black institutions. Indeed, each of
the constitutionally suspect policies the Fordice Court identified in
the Mississippi higher education system would be eliminated with
the closure of the state's black public colleges: differential admis-
sions standards, duplication of programs, different institutional
105. See supra note 83.
106. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 742 n.11 (1992).
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mission assignments, and the continued operation of eight
institutions.
The threat that a desegregation remedial duty presents to the
survival of black public colleges, and the educational opportunities
they offer, is not new. More than 20 years ago, the Attorney Gen-
eral of Virginia suggested to the Supreme Court that if Virginia
were required to dismantle its formerly dual system of higher
education:
[T]he State must take steps to phase out the two racially identifiable insti-
tutions in which 81% of its Negro students are concentrated. The "root" of
the formerly dual system ... is Virginia State College, which was specifi-
cally established for Negroes in 1882 . . . and is today over 96% Negro.
The "branch" of the formally dual system . . . is Norfolk State College,
which was indeed a branch of Virginia State College until 1969 and is today
almost 98% Negro.107
The threat has been renewed more recently. After the remand in
Fordice, the state contended before the district court that the
number of institutions in its higher education system "is the only
remnant of the past presently having segregative effects, without
sound educational justification and in need of reforming."108 To
bring itself into compliance with the Constitution, Mississippi pro-
posed to eliminate two of its black colleges through closure or
merger into white institutions. 109 Although the black colleges re-
107. Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix for Appellants at 22, Board of Visitors of
the College of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971) (No. 71-170). The dissenter in
the lower court in Norris succinctly described the effects of using institutional closure as a
desegregation remedy in higher education:
It would be a relatively simple procedure to completely dismantle the dual system
of higher education in Virginia by "phasing out" Virginia State College ... and
Norfolk State College . . . , each predominantly black and absorbing 81% of all
black students attending state-supported colleges and universities in Virginia. The
tragedy of such action would seriously affect the opportunities of worthy black
students to secure a college education. It could be argued that the thirteen (13)
predominantly white state-supported colleges or universities would be appropriate
to "phase out," but this would result in even greater disruption ....
Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (E.D. Va. 1971) (Hoffman,
J., dissenting).
108. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1445-46.
109. The state proposed to close Mississippi Valley State University and merge Missis-
sippi Valley State and Delta State University into a new institution, Delta Valley Univer-
sity, which would be located at the old Delta State University campus. Id. at 1487. Although
the district court described this proposal as a merger, it involved abandonment of the black
college campus and an uncertain future for the educational programs, faculty, and adminis-
trators of that institution. Id. As initially framed, the state's remedial proposal also sought
to give the white land grant university ("Mississippi State") control over the black land
grant ("Alcorn State"). Robert N. Davis, The Quest for Equal Education in Mississippi:
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ceived a temporary reprieve,110 the district court left the door open
to the future elimination of at least one black institution if the
state could support its view that closure was the only educationally
sound means of achieving desegregation."'
The uncertain future that desegregation remedies present for
black public colleges is not limited to Mississippi. In a bizarre twist
of fate, federal courts considering desegregation of the Alabama
system of higher education have looked to the closure of black
public colleges as a "remedy" for the state's long history of une-
qual treatment of those institutions. In an opinion issued prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Fordice, the district court in Ala-
bama found that the condition of the physical facilities at the
state's black colleges was a "vestige of segregation which must be
eliminated by the state if its actions are to comport with the Con-
stitution.""' 2 The court offered the state the remedial alternatives
of spending more than twenty million dollars to improve the black
college facilities or closing the institutions.13 According to the dis-
trict court, the Constitution did not preclude the state from choos-
ing the alternative - closing black colleges - that would have the
maximum, adverse impact on black educational opportunity.,"
In an opinion issued after Fordice, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit considered the Alabama plaintiffs' claim that
the district court erred in failing to order a remedy for past dis-
crimination in the assignment of missions and academic programs
to Alabama's black public colleges, and for the state's discrimina-
tory allocation of funding between its black and white land grant
The Implications of United States v. Fordice, 62 Miss. L.J. 405, 456 (1993); Lorne Fienberg,
Note, United States v. Fordice and the Desegregation of Public Higher Education: Groping
for Root and Branch, 34 B.C. L. REV. 803, 805 (1993). The state further offered to merge
two white institutions: Mississippi University for Women and Mississippi State University.
Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1488. The court rejected this last proposal as having "little
or no desegregative impact." Id. at 1490.
110. The state abandoned its proposed merger of the two land grant institutions. As to
the elimination of Mississippi Valley State, the district court found a lack empirical support
for the educational and fiscal soundness of the proposal. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at
1492, 1495.
111. Id. at 1495.
112. Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1370 (N.D. Ala. 1991), modified, 14 F.3d
1534 (11th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 1283, 1370-71. The court presented an additional option of transferring facil-
ities to the black colleges from other institutions. Id. at 1371.
114. The Alabama district court acknowledged that "the State of Alabama has no fed-
eral constitutional obligation to maintain any institution of higher education. It does, how-
ever, have the obligation to eliminate vestiges of segregation in those institutions it estab-
lishes and operates." Id. at 1371 n.163. Consequently, it concluded that the "state may
choose any option which will satisfy its obligation to eliminate the vestiges of segregation."
Id. at 1371.
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institutions. 115 In remanding these issues for further consideration
under the Fordice standard, the appellate court specifically in-
structed the district court judge to consider closure of institutions,
as well as plaintiffs' proposed enhancement of the black colleges,
as a remedy for the continuing segregative effects of past discrimi-
nation."6 As in Fordice, the Eleventh Circuit did not expressly
state that black colleges should be eliminated. However, the court
of appeals read Fordice to obligate the state "to adopt, from
among the full range of practicable and educationally sound alter-
natives . . . , the one that would achieve the greatest possible re-
duction in the identified segregative effects. 1" 7 The substantial ra-
cial identifiability of black public colleges and the uncertain
desegregative effect of black college enhancement" 9 suggests that
closing the institutions, rather than enhancing them or closing
white colleges, would achieve the greatest possible reduction in
segregation. Moreover, the effects of a long history of discrimina-
tion against black colleges and the cost of remedying those effects
support a finding that closure of a black college would be the more
practicable and educationally sound remedial alternative.
The possibility that the remedy for long-lasting discrimination
will be the elimination of colleges that continue to play a key role
in the higher education of black students is directly traceable to
Fordice's remedial focus on the racial distribution of students
rather than on the racial distribution of higher education opportu-
nity. The Fordice remedy turns on the presence and elimination of
segregative policies; the effect of desegregation remedies on black
educational opportunity is apparently not a factor in the remedial
calculus under the Constitution.
Despite the implications of the Court's reasoning, the elimina-
tion of black colleges is not a certainty under Fordice. Faced with
the prospect of such a major restructuring of a state's higher edu-
cation system, lower federal courts may conclude that the closure
remedy is not practicable or educationally sound. 20 The mere sur-
115. Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1542-43, 1546-48 (11th Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 1546, 1551.
117. Id. at 1541.
118. In 1994, Alabama's black land grant college had a 94% black undergraduate en-
rollment; enrollment at the state's second black institution was more than 97% black.
Knight, 900 F. Supp. at 296, 304.
119. See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1491 (explaining that the court was not
persuaded that adding programs and increasing budgets will desegregate a black college).
120. See Knight, 900 F. Supp. at 314 ("[A]t this point .... it is not educationally sound,
and most likely not practicable, to close" Alabama's black public colleges.); Ayers v. Fordice,
879 F. Supp. at 1492 (submitting that desegregative effect of "less drastic measures" should
be considered before black colleges closed).
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vival of the institutions, however, will not ensure racial equality in
public higher education. The vestiges of a century of discrimina-
tion remain at black public colleges in the form of restricted mis-
sions and educational programs, unequal facilities, and under-de-
veloped faculties. The narrow conception of constitutional equality
in Fordice is inadequate to protect black students from the dis-
criminatory effects of these vestiges.
4. Perpetuation of Separate and Unequal Education. In de-
vising the constitutional remedy for higher education, the Fordice
Court focused exclusively on the harm of racial separation and
failed to recognize the distinct constitutional violation resulting
from the unequal educational opportunity provided to black stu-
dents in racially separate colleges. Because Fordice recognized only
part of the harm, it fashioned an incomplete remedial duty: the
remedy addresses segregation but not educational inequality.
Moreover, satisfaction of the limited remedial duty under Fordice
does not mandate the elimination of segregation. The state is not
required to convert its black and white colleges to "just colleges;"
it is not even compelled to modify all policies that foster segrega-
tion. After a narrowly defined class of suspect policies are elimi-
nated or altered to the extent practicable, the continuing racial
identity of an institution does not violate the Constitution. Thus,
the Fordice remedy appears to embrace the worst of both worlds
- it permits an outcome which is both racially separate and une-
qual. This ironic result is evident in the district court's implemen-
tation of the Fordice remedy.
a. Segregation and Student Choice. After the remand in
Fordice, the district court found that Mississippi's eight public col-
leges had substantially retained the racial identity that character-
ized them during the era of de jure segregation. The three black
institutions employed more than 80% of the black faculty in the
system and each college had undergraduate enrollments that were
at least 92% black.'21 Although the white institutions had made
some progress in enrolling black undergraduates, the court found a
sizeable underrepresentation of black students at most of the white
schools 12 2 and a continuing racial identifiability in the administra-
tive and tenured faculty ranks of those institutions. 23 Moreover,
121. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1461, 1470 n.252.
122. Id. at 1469. In 1990, four of the five white institutions had more than 81% white
undergraduate students; the exception was Delta State which had an undergraduate enroll-
ment that was 78% white. Id. at 1470 n.252.
123. Id. at 1462. In 1992, black faculty comprised 17% of the faculty in the eight-col-
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the court expressly recognized that fulfillment of the Fordice reme-
dial duty would not necessarily eradicate the racial identifiability
of public colleges. 124 Because Fordice provides a state with a vari-
ety of ways to escape or limit even the narrow constitutional obli-
gation to modify policies that perpetuate segregation, continuing
racial separation is not only constitutional but also likely.
In discussing students' decisions as to which public institution
they will attend, the district court noted that students make segre-
gative choices of college because of several factors that are not sub-
ject to modification under Fordice. For example, the court found
that the racial composition of an institution's faculty can perpetu-
ate segregation by its influence on student choice.1 25 Despite this
acknowledged segregative effect resulting from racial imbalance in
the faculties of Mississippi's colleges, the court concluded that
Fordice required no adjustment of that imbalance because the
state's current employment policies and practices are not traceable
to de jure segregation.'26 Similarly, the court noted that the his-
toric racial identity of the white colleges, and the current under-
representation of minority students at those institutions, dissuade
black students from enrolling in them.127 Under Fordice, however,
the mere racial identifiability of an institution is not a sufficient
basis for remedial action.'28 The court also found that black stu-
dents' hesitancy to select a white public college in Mississippi is a
result, in part, of the reputation those institutions have within the
black community. That reputation, in turn, is influenced by the
historical roots of the institutions, their past discriminatory ac-
tions, and "continued links to the past in terms of the symbols
with which some universities and/or their alumni choose to iden-
tify.' 29 Concluding that there were no current policies or practices
traceable to de jure segregation that foster a racially inhospitable
climate at the white institutions, the district court ordered no re-
lege system, but accounted for just over 4% of the faculty at the five white institutions, id.
at 1461, and an even smaller percentage of the upper faculty ranks in those schools. Id. at
1460 & n.196. In 1992, administrators at the white institutions were 98% white and only 2%
black. Id. at 1460.
124. Id. at 1474.
125. Id. at 1463, 1471.
126. Id. at 1463, 1477.
127. Id. at 1470.
128. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743.
129. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1471. The "symbols" with links to the past ap-
pear to include the now abandoned practice at the University of Mississippi of using the
Confederate flag as a "pep symbol at athletic events" and that institution's continuing prac-
tice of playing "Dixie" at university functions. Id. at 1467. To accommodate those who per-
ceive "Dixie" as a racist song, the school also plays "Battle Hymn of the Republic" at public
functions. Id.
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medial action specifically designed to alter the black community's
perception of the white schools. 130
Despite the district court's rejection of remedial action
designed to impact student choice "in and of itself,"1 1 the limited
remedies the court ordered may produce some increase in the per-
centage of black students enrolled in the white institutions. A
gradual shift of black students to white schools, however, holds lit-
tle promise for changing the racial identity of the black colleges. In
Mississippi, as in other states subject to the Fordice remedy, the
public colleges established exclusively for blacks have overwhelm-
ingly black undergraduate enrollments. 13 2 Analyzing the institu-
tional preferences of Mississippi's college-bound students between
1990 and 1993, the district court found that of more than 15,000
white students indicating a preference for a public college in the
state, fewer than 100 registered a preference for a black public col-
lege. Only 15 of 15,000 white students selected a black public col-
lege in Mississippi as their first choice.133
The remedies ordered by the court are unlikely to have any
significant effect on white student enrollment decisions, and, there-
fore, on the racial characteristics of undergraduate enrollments at
the black colleges. The court found that the predominant charac-
teristic of the few white students preferring a black public college
was their lack of academic qualifications in terms of high school
grades, college preparatory courses, and ACT scores. 34 Thus, the
most far-reaching remedy ordered by the court - elimination of
the disparity in admissions standards 3 5 - will reduce the already
very small number of white students selecting black colleges.
White students who might have enrolled in a black institution be-
cause of its lower admissions requirements will no longer have that
option. Moreover, the court left substantially intact a distribution
130. Id. at 1477.
131. Id. at 1471.
132. In 1990, Mississippi's three black colleges had the following black undergraduate
enrollments: 92% at Jackson State, 94% at Alcorn State, and 99.5% at Mississippi Valley
State. Id. at 1471 n.252. In 1994, undergraduate black enrollment at Alabama's two black
institutions were 97% and 94% respectively. Knight v. Alabama, 900 F. Supp. at 296, 304.
The same pattern was evident in Louisiana. See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F.Supp.
499, 504 (E.D. La. 1989) (citing black enrollments of 95.8%, 92.7%, and 83.9% at the black
colleges in 1988).
133. Id. at 1470-71 & n.258. The student preferences considered by the court were
made in response to a questionnaire answered by white high school students who took the
ACT test and indicated a preference for a public institution in Mississippi. The district
court noted that the evidence suggests that this highly skewed pattern of preference is a
national phenomenon. Id. at 1471 n.258.
134. Id. at 1471.
135. Id. at 1477-83.
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of undergraduate programs in which more than three-fourths of
the programs offered by one or more of the black institutions is
duplicated by one or more of the white colleges. 136 In pursuing
their educational goals, most white students will continue to have a
choice of colleges based upon the racial identity of the institutions
rather than the programs offered. If white students continue to en-
roll in colleges in which they are the racial majority, the black col-
leges will remain substantially one-race schools.
In addition to being racially identifiable, the black colleges
also remain the primary source of publicly supported undergradu-
ate education for black students. Mississippi's three black institu-
tions enroll two-thirds of the black undergraduates in the state's
public system of higher education.137 While the Fordice remedies
may make white colleges somewhat more accessible to black stu-
dents and thus gradually decrease the percentage of black students
in black colleges, it seems likely that the black schools will educate
a substantial percentage of black undergraduates for many years to
come. The continuing concentration of black students in the col-
leges to which they were once confined by law raises the issue of
the quality of education the state provides those students.
b. Continuing Inequality in Educational Opportunity. Dur-
ing the Plessy era, the Constitution required - at least in theory
- that the segregationist states provide their black citizens with
equal institutions of higher education. Under Fordice, however, the
Constitution does not require equalization of institutions, even if
they remain racially identifiable. Responding to the private plain-
tiffs' contention that Mississippi must enhance its black public col-
leges, the Supreme Court created a much more limited remedial
duty for the state:
If we understand private petitioners to press us to order the upgrading of
Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley State solely so that they
may be publicly financed, exclusively black enclaves by private choice, we
reject that request. The State provides these facilities for all its citizens and
it has not met its burden under Brown to take affirmative steps to disman-
tle its prior de jure system when it perpetuates a separate, but "more
equal" one. Whether such an increase in funding is necessary to achieve a
full dismantlement under the standards we have outlined, however, is a dif-
ferent question, and one that should be addressed on remand. 13 8
It seems clear that a state does not satisfy its constitutional
136. Id. at 1442, 1486.
137. Id. at 1469-70.
138. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added).
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duty by perpetuating a racially separate and more equal system of
higher education. However, in its conception of petitioners' re-
quest, the Court answered the wrong question. Because Fordice
finds racial separation to be constitutionally acceptable after the
state has fulfilled its limited remedial duty, the more relevant
question is whether a state may maintain a system of higher edu-
cation that is both racially separate and unequal. It appears that
Fordice requires the upgrading of black public colleges only if it
will decrease segregation - "full dismantlement under the stan-
dards we have outlined" - and not to ensure equal educational
opportunity for those students who remain in segregated institu-
tions after the state implements the limited, Fordice desegregation
remedies. The district court on remand relied on that narrow con-
ception of the remedial duty.
After finding that during the period of de jure segregation
Mississippi had maintained inferior and unequal public colleges for
its black citizens, the district court considered the relationship be-
tween that discriminatory past and the current status of the black
institutions. In evaluating institutional missions, the court found
that the current limited missions of the black colleges were rem-
nants of the past and that the state's actions, before and after
Brown, perpetuated an inferior position for the black colleges in
relation to the state's white institutions. 39 Examining the two land
grant institutions, the court found that the continuing and near
total exclusion of the state's black college from state-supported
land grant activities was traceable to the era of de jure segregation
and past decisions to allocate resources on the basis of race. 40
More generally, the court found that in the past, Mississippi had
invested most of its resources in the institutions reserved for white
students and that the state's current actions perpetuate this his-
torical funding disparity.' 4 ' Similarly, the court found that now, as
during the era of de jure segregation, the black public colleges suf-
fer deficiencies, as compared with the white institutions, in equip-
ment and library facilities. 42
Although this past pattern of institutional inequality contin-
ued to determine the inferior position of Mississippi's black col-
leges, the district court refused to adopt remedial measures that
would significantly upgrade the quality of the black institutions.
The court concluded that broad scale enhancement of the black
institutions was not required under Fordice because such measures
139. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1438-39, 1445.
140. Id. at 1463, 1466, 1484.
141. Id. at 1452-53, 1477.
142. Id. at 1456-57, 1477.
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would not have a significant desegregative effect 4 s or because en-
hancement of the black colleges was not educationally sound or
practicable."4 4 The limited enhancement measures that the court
did adopt were designed to attract white students to the black col-
leges rather than to ensure equality of educational opportunity for
the black students who would dominate the undergraduate enroll-
ments of those schools for years to come. For example, nearly all of
the program enhancement measures included in the court's remedy
involved the addition of graduate programs145 which might attract
white graduate students, but which would have a limited effect on
undergraduate programs with predominantly black enrollments. 4"
c. Separate and Unequal. The district court recognized that
its Fordice remedy could result in racially separate and tangibly
unequal colleges, but concluded that it raised no constitutional is-
sue. Although it found that the more limited missions of Missis-
sippi's black colleges had the "effect of maintaining the status
quo" established during the period of de jure segregation, the
court viewed this remnant of the past as constitutionally insignifi-
cant in an educational system based on voluntary choice:
[Ilt is perhaps easy to fall into the perspective that views fewer comparable
offerings at a HBI [historically black institution] as indicia of discrimina-
tion against black students who are enrolled or who might later choose to
enroll in the HBIs but, when viewed from the perspective of the Constitu-
tion, citizens are not deprived of equal protection of the law where an equal
opportunity exists to attend either the more comprehensive HWIs [histori-
cally white institutions] or the less comprehensive HBIs and that opportu-
143. Id. at 1452-53, 1457-58 (funding and facilities). The court also found that some
forms of inequality remaining at the black colleges were not a significant deterrent to white
student enrollment. Id. at 1458, 1484 (facilities and land grant functions).
144. See id. at 1453, 1465-66, 1484-85 (funding, land grant functions, and missions).
145. The court's remedial decree requires that graduate programs in social work, urban
planning and business be developed at Jackson State ("JSU") and that the Board of Trust-
ees conduct a study to determine whether other programs should be added to JSU. Id. at
1494-95. The court also directed that an MBA program be offered by Alcorn State ("ASU")
at an off-campus center run by that institution. Id. at 1495. In addition, the decree provided
that endowment trusts, in the amount of five million dollars each, be created for JSU and
ASU, "with the income therefrom to be used to provide funds for continuing educational
enhancement and racial diversity, including recruitment of white students and scholarships
for white applicants . . . ." Id. Earlier in its opinion the Court found that the five white
colleges had amassed endowments averaging 23 million dollars while the three black college
endowments averaged less than two million dollars. Id. at 1451.
146. See Kenyon D. Bunch & Grant B. Mindle, Testing the Limits of Precedent: The
Application of Green to the Desegregation of Higher Education, 2 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J.
541, 587 (1992) (finding that most white students attending black colleges are enrolled in
evening classes at off-campus settings or in graduate and professional school programs).
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nity is truly unfettered by vestiges of the past .... 14
Similarly, the court dismissed the comparatively lower funding of
the black colleges as irrelevant to the issue of unconstitutional dis-
crimination as long as students have an "unfettered choice" of
institution.148
The difficulty with the court's analysis is that the "unfettered
choice" of black students is more theoretical than real. While the
court eliminated some of the factors influencing student choice,
such as differential admissions standards, the Fordice remedy left
intact other influences that direct black students to black colleges.
The district court concluded that the vestiges of racially identifi-
able faculties, administrators, and student bodies, as well as the
reputation that the white institutions have in the black commu-
nity, foster segregative enrollment decisions but are beyond the
scope of the Fordice remedy. 149 Consequently, what the court
termed "ghosts of the past"'15 0 continue to channel black students
into black institutions in which the "ghosts of the past" remain in
the form of limited missions, restricted program offerings, and une-
qual funding.
The possibility that Fordice will yield an outcome of separate
and unequal educational opportunity appears to have been realized
in the district court's treatment of Mississippi Valley State Univer-
sity ("MVSU"), one of Mississippi's three black public colleges.
The state opened MVSU in 195051 at a location which was only 35
miles from Delta State University, an undergraduate college that
was reserved for white students. 52 MVSU remained an exclusively
black college until it enrolled its first white student in 1970.'15 In
1990, the college's undergraduate enrollment was 99.5% black. 54
As was true of black public colleges generally during the era of
de jure segregation, 55 MVSU has the primary function of serving
educationally and economically disadvantaged black students. Its
entering freshmen have low ACT scores and more than half of
them are enrolled in developmental studies. All of its students re-
147. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1439.
148. Id. at 1452.
149. See supra pp. 40-41.
150. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1471.
151. Id. at 1440. The school was established as Mississippi Vocational College. Its name
was changed to Mississippi Valley State College in 1964; ten years later the legislature desig-
nated the institution a "university." Id. at 1440-41.
152. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1528; Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1486.
153. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1529.
154. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1470 n.252.
155. See Kujovich, supra note 22, at 69-71, 160-62.
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quire some form of financial aid.156 The district court recognized
the traditional and racially based mission of MVSU in finding that
the college is an efficient institution if "efficiency is measured in
terms of achieving higher education for educationally under-served
blacks at the lowest possible cost. '157
Racial identifiability and the function of serving under-pre-
pared black students are not the only vestiges of the past evident
at MVSU. The inequality that characterized the separate but
equal era continues to affect the institution and the students it
serves. Initially the school offered only precollegiate vocational
training. It gradually evolved into an undergraduate college for the
training of black teachers, 58 but was not accredited until 1968.159
Eighteen years later, the "ghosts" of past discrimination remained.
The institution ranked last among Mississippi's eight colleges in
the number of bachelor programs, number of bachelor's fields of-
fered, percentage of faculty holding a doctorate degree, number of
volumes in its library, and the replacement value of its facility. 60
Although the impact of the limited facilities and educational
programs at this least developed of Mississippi's public colleges
falls nearly exclusively on black students, the district court re-
jected remedial measures that would significantly improve the in-
stitution. In declining to order a remedy that would enhance
MVSU, the court considered only the desegregative effect of en-
hancement and not the effect it would have on the educational op-
portunity provided to black students:
[T]he court cannot find that institutional enhancement of MVSU will elimi-
nate the vestiges of segregation that have contributed to MVSU's status as
essentially a one-race institution. Evidence does not persuade the court that
merely adding programs and increasing budgets will desegregate a
HBI .... The court cannot find that institutional or programmatic en-
hancement of MVSU is justified as educationally sound for desegregation
purposes .... 161
The court's refusal to order any significant remedy for the
continuing unequal educational opportunity provided to black stu-
dents at MVSU exemplifies the inadequacy of the Fordice remedy.
The remedial focus is on the vestige of racial separation and not on
the vestiges of tangible inequality. At the same time, Fordice re-
156. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1488 & n.342.
157. Id. at 1491.
158. Id. at 1440.
159. Id. at 1441.
160. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d at 739 n.24, 742.
161. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1491.
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jects a remedial goal of fully desegregated colleges and universities.
Thus, full compliance with the constitutionally required remedy
may leave significant numbers of black students in racially sepa-
rate and unequal institutions.
Although apparently permitted by Fordice, this ironic and un-
desirable result may not be inevitable. 162 However, even the possi-
bility of such a result suggests the need for an alternative remedial
approach. Executive Branch enforcement of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 offers that alternative.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE VIOLATION UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Section 601 of Title VI provides in relevant part:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.1 63
Under section 602 of the Act, each federal department and agency
dispensing federal funds "is authorized and directed to effectuate
the provisions of section [601]" by issuing regulations which be-
come effective only upon approval by the President. 64 Section 602
further provides that compliance with "any requirement adopted
pursuant to this section" may be secured by the termination of
federal funds or "by any other means authorized by law."' 65 The
statute does not define "discrimination" and thus leaves undeter-
mined the reach of section 601's broad prohibition. Nor does the
Act elaborate on the remedial power implicit in its requirement
that federal agencies effectuate the general prohibition against
discrimination.
This Part discusses the extent to which Title VI authorizes the
Executive Branch to prohibit forms of racial discrimination not
162. In an opinion issued before Fordice, the district court in Alabama included in its
remedial order a requirement of increased funding for Alabama's black public colleges and
actions by the state to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination evident in the physical
facilities of those institutions. Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. at 1378-79. The court noted
that its findings concerning physical facilities "are not based on an institutional enhance-
ment theory but rather on the realization that the adequacy of facilities has a direct and
immediate impact on individual students as they consider which institution to attend." Id.
at 1283. In an appeal filed before but decided after Fordice, the defendants did not chal-
lenge these remedial measures. Knight, 14 F.3d at 1538-39.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
165. Id.
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considered in Fordice, and therefore to require remedial actions in
addition to those mandated by the Fordice Court. Section A exam-
ines the relationship between the statutory and constitutional
standards of violation. The Supreme Court's cases addressing this
issue suggest that Title VI empowers administrative agencies to
adopt regulations prohibiting, as a condition of federal funding,
forms of discrimination that would not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Section B assumes that Title VI prohibits only racial
discrimination which also violates the Constitution. After examin-
ing elements of the constitutional violation not considered by the
Fordice Court, Section B concludes that Title VI authorizes Exec-
utive action beyond the Fordice mandate, even if the statute and
the Constitution are coextensive.
A. Statutory and Constitutional Standards of Violation
Opinions in several cases decided by the Supreme Court have
offered confusing and seemingly inconsistent pronouncements on
the scope of the violation created by section 601 of Title VI, and
on the reach of administrative authority delegated by section 602
of the statute. In 1974, the Court held that governmental actions
that were not undertaken with a discriminatory purpose neverthe-
less violated Title VI regulations prohibiting actions with a dis-
criminatory effect. Subsequently, the Court decided that discrimi-
natory purpose is an essential element of an equal protection
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Taken together, these
two cases suggested that the Title VI standard of violation is dif-
ferent from, and more extensive than, the constitutional standard.
Nevertheless, the Court later appeared to decide that the Title VI
and constitutional standards are coextensive. As if to make the
confusion complete, the Court subsequently held that Title VI reg-
ulations may prohibit actions with a discriminatory effect even if
those actions do not violate the Constitution. A determination of
the relationship between the Title VI and constitutional standards
of prohibited discrimination requires a deciphering of these cases.
Although the matter is not free of ambiguity, a majority of the
Court appears to have adopted the view that federal agencies have
the authority to prohibit, through regulations implementing Title
VI, state actions that do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
In Lau v. Nichols,166 students of Chinese ancestry who did not
speak English claimed that the San Francisco public school district
denied them equal educational opportunity in violation of Title VI
166. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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and the Constitution. The students' claims were not based upon
intentional discrimination but on the discriminatory impact result-
ing from the district's use of English as the language of instruction
in its schools. 67 Concluding that the students had failed to show a
violation of either the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief.16 The
Supreme Court reversed, relying on Title VI and without reaching
the constitutional claim. 16
9
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas found that Title VI
regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare ("HEW") prohibited actions having a discriminatory ef-
fect, "even though no purposeful design is present." 70 Finding
that the effect of the school district's policy of instruction in En-
glish had "all the earmarks of discrimination banned by the regu-
lations,"' 71 the Court reversed and remanded the case for a deter-
mination of an appropriate remedy. 7 2
At the time it was issued, the Lau decision appeared to be
unexceptional. Under section 602 of Title VI, HEW was authorized
to promulgate regulations implementing the congressional policy
prohibiting discrimination in federally funded programs. 7 3 In car-
rying out that delegated power, HEW had determined that provid-
ing education in the English language to students who did not
speak that language constituted "discrimination" in violation of
section 601, even in the absence of a discriminatory purpose. While
the majority opinion did not expressly state that regulations
prohibiting actions with a discriminatory effect were within the
scope of authority delegated to HEW, its decision necessarily car-
ries that implication. 7 4
Concurring in the Lau result, Justice Stewart expressly ad-
dressed what the majority had decided by implication: "whether
the regulations and guidelines promulgated by HEW go beyond
the authority of § 601.' '1 75 In concluding that HEW had acted
within the scope of its statutory authority, Justice Stewart invoked
167. Id. at 569-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
168. Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
169. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
170. Id. at 568.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 569.
173. Id. at 566-67.
174. See id. at 569 ("[T]he Federal Government has the power to fix the terms on
which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed .... Whatever may be the
limits of that power . . . , they have not been reached here." (citations omitted)).
175. Id. at 571. (Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined Justice Stewart's opinion. Id. at 569.
[Vol. 44
1996] DESEGREGATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 39
two established principles of administrative law. First, regulations
promulgated under a general statutory authorization are valid if
they are reasonably related to the purposes of the authorizing stat-
ute. Second, in determining the purposes of a remedial statute, a
court should accord great weight to a consistent construction of a
statute by the administrative agency empowered to implement
it.17 Applying these principles in Lau, Justice Stewart found that
HEW had reasonably and consistently interpreted section 601 to
require affirmative assistance to non-English speaking students. 7
Justice Stewart's opinion included an additional observation
that foreshadowed the confusion arising after Lau. Although he
agreed with the majority that the HEW regulations prohibited cer-
tain discriminatory impacts, Justice Stewart thought it "not en-
tirely clear that § 601. . .standing alone, would render illegal the
expenditure of federal funds" in the absence of intentional dis-
crimination. 17 8 While this observation might be read as suggesting
a divergence between the scope of Title VI and the scope of Title
VI regulations, it embodies a much less controversial notion. When
Congress delegates to an executive agency the power to implement
a general statutory policy, elaboration and implementation of the
legislative policy depend on the judgment of the agency to which
power has been delegated. In the absence of an agency determina-
tion that a particular practice is inconsistent with the statutory
policy, that practice is not necessarily unlawful. As Justice Frank-
furter observed many years ago in SEC v. Chenery:
[B]efore transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed. . . they must fall
under the ban of some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of
government authorized to prescribe such standards - either the courts or
Congress or an agency to which Congress has delegated its authority.17
Relying on what has become an established principle of adminis-
trative law, Justice Frankfurter in Chenery further recognized that
when an agency has not outlawed a particular practice as inconsis-
tent with a general statutory policy, a court should not exercise the
authority delegated to the agency. When the question turns on "a
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is au-
thorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment
cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment."'80
176. Id. at 571.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 318 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1943).
180. Id. at 88. The fact that a court has declined to find that a practice is inconsistent
with statutory policy (and therefore illegal) does not prevent the agency from outlawing the
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Thus, as Justice Stewart observed in Lau, courts applying a gen-
eral statutory prohibition "standing alone" should not necessarily
invalidate actions that an agency's implementing regulations could
prohibit.
Although Justice Stewart recognized the authority of adminis-
trative agencies to refine and elaborate the general policy against
discrimination found in Title VI, neither he nor the Lau majority
considered the relationship between unlawful discrimination under
the statute and unconstitutional discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Two years after Lau, the Supreme Court held
that unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause does not include what Lau recognized as a violation of Title
VI. In Washington v. Davis,181 applicants for positions as police
officers claimed that a requirement of satisfactory performance on
a written test was unconstitutional because it had a disproportion-
ate, adverse impact on black applicants. The Court rejected that
claim and held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
purposeful discrimination; mere discriminatory effect is insufficient
to establish a constitutional violation.18 2 After Washington v. Da-
vis, it appeared that Lau stood for the proposition that Title VI -
or more precisely, regulations promulgated under the statute -
prohibits racial discrimination that does not violate the Constitu-
tion. That proposition was called into question by Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.'5 3
Allan Bakke contended that racially based, affirmative action
admissions decisions by a public university violated both the Four-
teenth Amendment and Title VI. Two of the opinions in Bakke,
commanding a majority of five Justices, expressly addressed the
question of the relationship between the Title VI and constitu-
tional standards of violation.184 Broad statements in both opinions
suggest that a majority of the Court concluded generally that the
Title VI standard of violation is coextensive with that of the Con-
stitution. Justice Powell found in the statute's legislative history
practice at a later time. After the Court's first Chenery decision, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission exercised its delegated authority and outlawed precisely the practice
that the Court had previously found to be lawful in the absence of agency action. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
181. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
182. Id.
183. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
184. Id. at 284-87 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 328-55
(Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, did not
decide the question of the relationship between the Title VI and constitutional standards of
prohibited discrimination. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"evidence of the incorporation of a constitutional standard into Ti-
tle VI."'1 85 The joint opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun expressed the view that "Title VI's definition of ra-
cial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the
Constitution's."' 186
These broad statements appear to constitute an implicit over-
ruling of Lau.187 There are, however, several reasons for reading
Bakke more narrowly. First, Bakke presented only the specific is-
sue of whether Title VI prohibits race-based affirmative action
when such action is permitted by the Constitution. 188 The case did
not require a decision on the general congruence between Title VI
and the Constitution. Less sweeping language in both of the rele-
vant opinions supports a reading of Bakke as limited to the nar-
rower issue. Justice Powell concluded that "Title VI must be held
to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate
[the Constitution]."' 8 9 Similarly, the joint opinion of four Justices
agreed that "Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race
than the Equal Protection Clause." 90 If Bakke decided only that
Title VI and the Constitution impose the same limitations on the
use of race-conscious affirmative action, then it did not reject Lau's
implication that the statute can reach other forms of discrimina-
tion not prohibited by the Constitution. As Justice White observed
in a later case: "Although some of the language in Bakke has a
broader sweep, the holdings in Bakke and Lau are entirely
consistent."' 9'
Second, despite the apparent inconsistency between Lau and
the broad statements in Bakke, the Court did not overrule Lau.
The joint opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun is particularly noteworthy on this point. While expres-
sing "serious doubts" that Lau could survive a determination that
the constitutional and statutory definitions of "discrimination" are
coextensive, the joint opinion went on to explain that Lau's recog-
nition of an impact violation would support, not detract from,
Bakke's conclusion that Title VI permits race-conscious affirmative
185. Id. at 286.
186. Id. at 352.
187. See id. (expressing "serious doubts" about Lau's implication that discriminatory
impact alone violates Title VI).
188. As framed by Justice Powell, the Court considered "the proposition that § 601
enacted a purely color-blind scheme, without regard to the reach of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 284-85.
189. Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
191. Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 590 (1983).
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action.192
- Finally, in concluding that Title VI did not prohibit affirma-
tive action in university admissions, the joint opinion of the four
Bakke Justices relied on the principle of administrative law ap-
plied by Justice Stewart in Lau. Citing Lau, the joint Bakke opin-
ion noted that HEW regulations implementing Title VI and per-
mitting affirmative action "are entitled to considerable deference
in construing Title VI."'"9 It is not at all clear why this principle of
judicial deference would apply if Title VI incorporated a constitu-
tional standard of violation. Rather, it appears that the Justices
who authored the joint opinion were deferring to HEW's imple-
mentation of a separate, statutory standard.
Bakke's pronouncements on the relationship between the con-
stitutional and Title VI standards of unlawful discrimination re-
main somewhat enigmatic. On the one hand, five Justices in Bakke
suggested that the statute and the Constitution impose the same
prohibitions against racial discrimination. On the other hand, the
narrowness of the issue necessary to the judgment in Bakke, the
Court's failure to overrule Lau, and the willingness of four Justices
to defer to an administrative interpretation of Title VI combine to
suggest that Bakke should be read more narrowly and that Lau
survived the Bakke decision.
Perhaps the most satisfactory way to reconcile the two cases is
to read the broad language in the Bakke opinions as a decision on
the reach of the statutory violation when Title VI is - to borrow
Justice Stewart's phrase in Lau - "standing alone." Under this
reading, Bakke would not overrule Lau's conclusion that the Exec-
utive Branch has a substantial measure of discretion to elaborate
upon and implement the statute through regulations that effectu-
ate the provisions of section 601. This is the reading of Bakke
adopted by a majority of the Court when it revisited the question
of a Title VI discriminatory impact violation five years later.
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,9 4 mi-
nority police officers claimed that police department examinations
having a discriminatory effect on minority applicants violated Title
VI. While the Court was widely fragmented on each of the four
related issues raised by the case, 9 ' two propositions clearly com-
192. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 351-53.
193. Id. at 342. The joint opinion discussed HEW regulations permitting affirmative
action under some circumstances. Id. at 344-45.
194. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
195. Guardians is the most confusing of the Court's Title VI decisions. The Justices
disagreed on each of the four issues addressed in the case. In addition to deciding whether
Title VI and Title VI regulations prohibit actions with a discriminatory effect, the Court
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manded a majority. Seven Justices in Guardians agreed that
Bakke had decided that the standard for a violation of Title VI
tracked that of the Constitution and therefore a violation of the
statute, absent implementing regulations, requires proof of inten-
tional discrimination.'96 A different majority of five Justices fur-
ther held that an impact violation could be created by administra-
tive regulations promulgated under section 602.197 The matter thus
seems to have been resolved in the manner that Justice Stewart
outlined nearly a decade earlier in Lau - Title VI standing alone
prohibits only intentional discrimination that would violate the
Constitution, but agencies charged with enforcement of the statute
may, through regulations under section 602, extend the scope of
unlawful discrimination.
In 1985, two years after Guardians, the Court agreed on this
interpretation of the statute. Writing for a unanimous Court in Al-
exander v. Choate,'98 Justice Marshall characterized the Guardi-
ans decision as follows: "First, the Court held that Title VI itself
directly reached only instances of intentional discrimination. Sec-
ond, the Court held that actions having an unjustifiable disparate
impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regula-
tions designed to implement the purposes of Title VI."' '
After its reaffirmation by the unanimous Court in Choate, the
Guardians decision on the reach of Title VI appears to have sur-
decided whether Title VI is enforceable in a private action and whether compensatory relief
may be afforded in a private action under Title VI. A majority of six Justices agreed that a
private action could be brought to enforce Title VI. Id. at 593-95 (Opinion of White, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J.); id. at 624-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 635-36 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting). Of these, only four concluded that
compensatory relief is available in a private action. Id. at 624-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
id. at 636-39 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Five Justices agreed to constitute the judgment of the Court that theplaintiff police
officers were not entitled to the relief they sought under Title VI. Id. at 584 (Opinion of
White, J.). There was not, however, a majority of the Court for any of the three different
bases upon which the judgment rested.
196. Id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 612-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 639-42 (Ste-
vens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 591-93 (Opinion of White, J.); id. at 623 n.15 (Marhall, J., dissenting); id. at
642-45 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). Choate involved the question of an impact violation under
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which, in language substantially the same as that
used in Title VI, prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons in federally funded
programs. See id. at 290.
199. Id. at 293. See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 n.9
(1984) ("A majority of the [Guardians] Court agreed that retroactive relief is available to
private plaintiffs for all discrimination, whether intentional or unintentional, that is actiona-
ble under Title VI.").
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vived the Court's subsequent and brief consideration of the issue.
However, Fordice itself may revive the confusion that existed
before Guardians. In Bazemore v. Friday,°0 a case that was piv-
otal in the Fordice litigation,0 1 private plaintiffs seeking desegre-
gation of 4-H and Extension Homemaker Clubs relied on the Four-
teenth Amendment and on Department of Agriculture regulations
requiring State Extension Services to take affirmative action to
overcome the effects of past discrimination.0 2 In an opinion com-
manding a majority of the Court on this issue, 05 Justice White
treated the claim under the Title VI regulations as separate from
the constitutional claim, but deferred to the Agriculture Depart-
ment's representation that there had been full compliance with its
regulations.20 4
In Fordice, the Court of Appeals found it "unnecessary. . . to
discuss the scope of Mississippi's duty" under a virtually identical
regulation issued by the Department of Education, because "the
duty outlined by the Supreme Court in Bazemore controls in Title
VI cases."205 Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in
Fordice, Justice White included a footnote in his opinion conclud-
ing that the "Court of Appeals . . . misanalyzed the Title VI
claim":2o6
It will be recalled... that the relevant agency and the courts had specifi-
cally found no violation of the regulation in Bazemore. Insofar as it failed to
perform the same factual inquiry and application as the courts in Bazemore
had made, therefore, the Court of Appeals' reliance on Bazemore to avoid
conducting a similar analysis in this case was inappropriate.2 07
While this treatment of the Court of Appeals' opinion appears to
recognize and preserve the distinction between a constitutional vi-
olation and unlawful discrimination under Title VI regulations,
Justice White's footnote went on to dispose of the Title VI claim:
200. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
201. See supra pp. 11-15.
202. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408 (White, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 387-88.
204. Id. at 408-09. Justice White's cursory treatment of the issue did not discuss or cite
Lau, Bakke, or Guardians. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan strongly disagreed
with the Court's conclusion that continuing segregation of the clubs was consistent with the
regulation's requirement of eliminating the effects of past discrimination. Id. at 411-14
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's opinion also appeared to assume, without men-
tioning the relevant cases, that the Title VI issue was distinct from the constitutional claim.
Id.
205. Ayers v. Allian, 914 F.2d at 687 n.11.
206. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 732 n.7.
207. Id. (citations omitted).
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Private petitioners reiterate in this Court their assertion that the state sys-
tem also violates Title VI, citing a regulation to that statute which requires
states to "take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimi-
nation." Our cases make clear, and the parties do not disagree, that the
reach of Title VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth
Amendment. We thus treat the issues in this case as they are implicated
under the Constitution.
20 8
It is true that the Court's prior cases establish that the protec-
tions of Title VI, in the absence of implementing regulations, ex-
tend no further than the Constitution. However, those cases also
"make clear" that agencies dispensing federal funds have the
power to effectuate the statute's protection by adopting regulations
which prohibit forms of racial discrimination that do not violate
the Constitution. Although the precise meaning of Fordice's casual
pronouncements on the reach of Title VI is not immediately evi-
dent,09 it seems unlikely that the Court used ambiguous language
in a footnote implicitly to overrule Lau and Guardians and to re-
ject the clear statement of Choate.210
Moreover, the Guardians resolution of the Title VI issue in-
corporates an appropriate division of Title VI authority between
courts and administrative agencies. Congress intended that section
601's prohibition against racial discrimination would be adminis-
tratively implemented and enforced. Section 602 delegates to each
federal agency with funding responsibilities a general rulemaking
authority to effectuate the provisions of section 601. It further re-
quires that implementing regulations "be consistent with achieve-
ment of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assis-
208. Id. (citations omitted).
209. Perhaps the Court implicitly interpreted the Education Department's regulation
to require no more than the Constitution and thus the Title VI claim was essentially based
on the statute standing alone. If that was the Court's conclusion, however, it is not clear
why it would be "inappropriate" for the Court of Appeals to avoid a separate analysis of the
Title VI claim.
210. It seems particularly unlikely that Justice White would announce such a sweeping
change in the law without comment on prior, inconsistent opinions which he had authored.
Justice White was one of the four Justices who issued the joint opinion in Bakke. United
States v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978). In his Guardians opinion, Justice White read
Bakke's decision on Title VI to be limited to the narrow issue of race-based affirmative
action and "plainly not determinative of whether Title VI proscribes unintentional discrimi-
nation in addition to the intentional discrimination that the Constitution forbids." Guardi-
ans Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 590 (1988). He further noted that Bakke left
undisturbed the conclusion of three concurring Justices in Lau that agencies "charged with
enforcing Title VI had sufficient discretion to enforce the statute by forbidding uninten-
tional as will as intentional discrimination." Id. at 592. Justice White also wrote the opinion
adopted by a majority of the Bazemore Court that treated a claim under Title VI regula-
tions as distinct from a constitutional claim. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 409 (1986).
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tance."211 It seems clear that the powers conferred by section 602
call for the exercise of administrative discretion in implementing
Title VI across the full range of federally funded programs.
While there may be some common ground among those pro-
grams as to what measures will effectively protect against racial
discrimination, the particular regulatory requirements necessary to
effectuate section 601 may well depend on the context of the pro-
gram receiving federal funding. In some instances, a simple ban of
intentionally discriminatory acts might suffice. In others, a prophy-
lactic prohibition against actions with a discriminatory effect may
be necessary because a determination of intent is difficult, costly,
or inconsistent with achievement of the objectives of the funding
statute.212 In programs with a history of discrimination, federal
agencies might find it necessary to prohibit what would otherwise
be lawful actions to ensure that the effects of past discrimination
are not perpetuated.213
Under the scheme of administrative enforcement established
by Title VI, the decision as to what is necessary to effectuate the
provisions of the Act is made by the departments and agencies
that fund the programs subject to the statute's protections. As set
forth in section 603, the primary role of the courts is to exercise
the power of judicial review that usually applies to the actions of
administrative agencies. 214 Thus, in the usual case, a court is re-
quired to determine only whether an agency's regulations, and its
application of them, are within the authority delegated and are a
reasonable elaboration of the delegating statute.2 15
The courts, however, have been willing to entertain the un-
usual case. Lau, Bakke, and Guardians each involved private ac-
tions brought directly against the recipients of federal funds,
rather than appeals from administrative determinations under Ti-
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
212. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (stating that inordi.
nate costs of litigation justify voting rights remedies that do not require prior judicial find-
ing of violation).
213. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980) (upholding voting
rights remedies addressed to actions that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination);
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1988).
215. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984). The "substantial deference" accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statute it is
charged with administering also applies when the agency alters its prior interpretation. Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1991). The deference normally shown to an agency by a
reviewing court should be particularly applicable in the context of Title VI regulations
which enjoy the special stature conferred by presidential approval. 42 U.S.C. § 200d-1
(1988).
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tle VI.216 In a direct private action, a court may be asked to deter-
mine the reach of the statutory prohibition, without the benefit of
an administrative elaboration of the statutory policy. If a court at-
tempts to make "a judicial judgment ... do service for an admin-
istrative judgment, 21'7 it intrudes upon the authority delegated to
administrative agencies under section 602.218 The Guardians ma-
jorities resolved this problem in a manner consistent with the ap-
propriate roles of courts and agencies. In the absence of adminis-
trative guidance, a court makes only a judicial judgment -
whether the challenged actions violate the constitutional standard
of racial discrimination. A decision on the meaning of Title VI
standing alone would not preclude an administrative judgment as
to what other forms of discrimination should be prohibited in or-
der to effectuate the provisions of the Act.
Exercising the authority granted under Title VI, federal de-
partments and agencies could prohibit, as a condition of federal
funding, state actions that would not violate the constitutional
standard announced in Fordice. In segregated systems of public
higher education, the regulatory prohibition could, for example,
encompass policies and practices that have a current discrimina-
tory effect, even if they are not traceable to past de jure segrega-
tion. Moreover, the reach of Title VI regulations need not be lim-
ited to actions producing or preserving the segregation of students,
but could extend to state policies resulting in other forms of dis-
crimination. For example, policies that restrict the funding and
educational programs of public colleges serving a predominantly
black student population would be encompassed within the Title
VI regulatory authority if those actions perpetuate inequality in
the educational opportunities afforded to black students. More
generally, the authority delegated under Title VI permits federal
departments and agencies to develop a statutory prohibition of dis-
crimination broader than the constitutional standard announced in
Fordice.
With effective Title VI regulations, the Executive Branch
could supplement, rather than simply follow, the judiciary's con-
ception of racial equality in higher education. Administrative ac-
216. Although each of these cases included private enforcement claims under Title VI,
the Court did not decide that such actions were permissible until Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S.
at 582.
217. SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
218. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1206-07 (1982) (Judicial creation of private rights of action "may
usurp the agency's responsibility for regulatory implementation. . . and force courts to de-
termine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory statute.").
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tion in pursuit of a broader conception of equality, however, does
not depend upon a divergence between the constitutional and stat-
utory standards of violation. Fordice considered only part of the
constitutional violation inherent in segregated public colleges. A
more complete view of the constitutional violation provides the
Executive Branch with an alternative source of remedial power.
B. The Constitutional Standard of Violation
As discussed in Part I, public higher education for blacks in
the segregationist states was not only racially separate but also un-
equal, and the effects of that inequality perpetuate discrimination
against black students.2 19 A complete conception of the constitu-
tional standard of equality, and of the constitutional violations cre-
ated by separate and unequal schools, provides an alternative basis
for Executive Branch remedial action. Even if the Title VI prohibi-
tion of discrimination is limited to unconstitutional discrimination,
the statute is a source of administrative authority to remedy not
only segregation, but also inequality in education.
Fordice embraced a view of the equal protection violation that
is limited to the racial separation that characterized "separate but
equal" colleges. Even where the continuing vestiges of Mississippi's
past discrimination were most obviously the product of state-im-
posed inequality, the Fordice Court viewed the violation only in
terms of segregation. For example, the majority recognized that
historically Mississippi restricted the funding and academic mis-
sions of its black public colleges, 220 a practice common to all the
segregationist states. 221 Nevertheless, when considering the cur-
rent, restricted academic missions of Mississippi's black colleges,
the Court concluded that the "mission designations ...have as
their antecedents the policies enacted to perpetuate racial separa-
tion.' '222 Inequality, however, is not an inevitable concomitant of
segregation. Restricted funding and academic missions were
designed not to segregate black students, but to discriminate
against them after they had been isolated in black colleges. Thus,
the harm of de jure segregation, as it was practiced in Mississippi
and other states, was not simply the intangible effects of racial sep-
aration; it included the tangible inequality of the black public col-
leges and the education they provided their students. The anteced-
ents of the inequalities evident in Mississippi's black public
219. See supra pp. 4-13.
220. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 739-41.
221. See Kujovich, supra note 22, at 45-81, 100-06.
222. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 740.
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colleges today are not policies of racial separation, but policies
designed to limit the quality and quantity of education available to
blacks.223
The Court's incomplete view of the violation led to its narrow
conception of the remedial obligation. As conceived by the
majority:
[T]he "primary issue" in this case is whether the State has met its affirma-
tive duty to dismantle its prior dual university system.
Our decisions establish that a State does not discharge its constitu-
tional obligations until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its
prior de jure dual system that continue to foster segregation.224
Fordice shows no apparent constitutional concern for continuing
inequality in the education afforded to black students who remain
in racially identifiable public colleges after the state has satisfied
its remedial duty.225 Both the violation and the remedy focus on
state-compelled segregation and ignore the constitutional evil of
tangibly unequal public colleges.
This restricted judicial conception of the constitutional viola-
tion and the remedial duty is the direct result of the Court's deci-
sions in Brown v. Board of Education.228 In Brown I, the Court
proceeded on the assumption "that the Negro and white schools
involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect
to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and
other 'tangible' factors. ' 227 The assumed tangible equality of the
schools led the Court to conclude that racial separation is inher-
ently unequal.22 6 The Court thus foreclosed the need for individu-
alized findings of tangible inequality between black and white
schools in each separate and unequal school district. Segregated
school districts could be found in violation of the Constitution
without a case-by-case evaluation of their facilities and educational
223. Justice Scalia's opinion in Fordice also ignores the tangible inequality that charac-
terized segregated public education. In his view: "The constitutional evil of the 'separate but
equal' regime that we confronted in Brown I was that blacks were told to go to one set of
schools, whites to another." Id. at 754 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Later in his opinion, Justice Scalia exhibited a seemingly willful blindness to the historical
record by asserting that the requirement of equal funding of black and white colleges "'was
part and parcel of the prior dual system.'" Id. at 759. Whatever the characteristics of Mis-
sissippi's racially dual system of higher education, equal funding was not one of them.
224. Id. at 728.
225. See id. at 741 ("We do not suggest that absent discriminatory purpose the assign-
ment of different missions to various institutions ... would raise an equal protection issue
where one or more of the institutions become or remain predominantly black or white.").
226. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
227. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492.
228. Id. at 495.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
programs. While this approach broadened the application of the
Brown decision, it also diminished the scope of the constitutional
harm considered by the Court.
Brown I's benign, but incomplete conception of the constitu-
tional violation determined the scope of the constitutional remedy.
In Brown II, the Court adopted a remedial goal designed "to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on
a nonracial basis. 2 29 More than a decade later, in Green v. County
School Board, 0 the Court interpreted that remedial goal to re-
quire "the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems."2'' Subse-
quently, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion,25 2 the Court reaffirmed its focus on the constitutional harm of
racial separation and the remedial duty to desegregate:
The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Segregation was the evil struck down
by Brown I as contrary to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitu-
tion. That was the violation sought to be corrected by the remedial mea-
sures of Brown IL That was the basis for the holding in Green .... 233
Cases after Swann preserved the Court's narrow focus on the racial
separation element of the violation, even as they expanded the
scope of the desegregation remedy.2 4
Developments in the remedial law applicable to elementary
and secondary education mitigated the consequences of failing to
consider both elements of the constitutional violation.23 5 The de-
229. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01.
230. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
231. Id. at 437.
232. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
233. Id. at 15.
234. In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), the Court preserved its narrow focus
on segregation as a constitutional violation but endorsed the remedy of compensatory edu-
cation, which would appear to be a remedy for educational inequality. The Milliken major-
ity offered a somewhat unconvincing explanation of why the need for compensatory educa-
tion resulted from the mere separation of black and white students:
Children who have thus been educationally and culturally set apart from the
larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes
reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for ex-
ample, which vary from the environment in which they must ultimately function
and compete, if they are to enter and be part of that community. This is not
peculiar to race; in this setting, it can affect any children who, as a group, are
isolated by force of law from the mainstream.
Id. at 287. Justice Powell was apparently unconvinced and suggested in his concurring opin-
ion that a constitutional remedy should not include educational programs unless a court
found past discrimination and inequality in the operation of those programs. Id. at 295, 298
& n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
235. The continuing discrimination that resulted from Brown's failure to take account
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mand of the post-Brown cases that school districts eliminate the
racial identifiability of their schools through a general redistribu-
tion of students28 6 meant that any continuing disparities between
formerly black and formerly white schools would not be racially
targeted. Moreover, the elementary and secondary remedial cases
ultimately came to consider the inequalities of black schools as in-
dicia of the segregation aspect of the constitutional violation. As
formulated in Swann, "corrective action must be taken with regard
to the maintenance of buildings and the distribution of equip-
ment" because "[i]n these areas, normal administrative practice
should produce schools of like quality, facilities, and staffs.
23 7
Swann and related cases may also have recognized the need to
remedy educational inequalities since the desegregation remedy
did not necessarily require a completely proportional distribution
of black and white students in each school.238 In the absence of
school equalization, a school that remained black could be both ra-
cially separate and unequal - a result the elementary and second-
ary remedial cases did not tolerate.
The safeguards against continuing and racially targeted ine-
quality that emerged in the elementary and secondary cases are
absent from the remedy the Court has formulated for higher edu-
cation. Fordice does not require the elimination of racial iden-
tifiability or the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation.
As summarized by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion, "we
focus on the specific policies alleged to produce racial imbalance,
rather than on the imbalance itself. 2 e3 9 Moreover, segregative poli-
cies are not subject to remedial modification unless they are
"traceable to the de jure system" and unless their reformation is
both "practicable and consistent with sound educational prac-
of the tangible inequality that characterized black elementary and secondary schools should
not be understated. No remedy was provided to the black students who received their edu-
cation in inferior schools after 1954 and before the Court interpreted Brown II to require
actual desegregation of public school systems. Nor did these students benefit from the later
decision in Milliken to include compensatory education as part of the desegregation remedy.
See supra note 234.
236. See Green, 391 U.S. at 442 (school districts obligated to convert "to a system with-
out a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools"); Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (consti-
tutional duty requires "every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation").
237. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18-19. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 507-08 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that quality of physical plant and per pupil expenditures are
indicators of racial identifiability); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 465 (1972)
(stating that inequality of black and white schools indicates perpetuation of segregation).
238. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24.
239. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 746 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (second emphasis
added).
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tices. '' 240 Finally, because Fordice does not adopt Swann's require-
ment that a remedy eliminate the indicia of segregation, whether it
be racial identifiability or institutional inequality, it imposes no di-
rect duty on the state to remedy the continuing effects of past dis-
criminatory treatment of the colleges created for black students.
The enhancement of black colleges is required, if at all, only to the
extent that it serves Fordice's more limited desegregation
mandate. 4
Although the Fordice Court did not expressly address the
matter, continuing institutional inequality might be justified by
the presence of voluntary student choice in higher education.242
Nearly all state systems of public higher education include institu-
tions that are unequal in their levels of funding, program offerings,
facilities, and qualification of faculty. In a system without a history
of racially based inequality, students who elect to attend or are
admitted to only the less adequate colleges are not subjected to
unconstitutional discrimination. Absent a discriminatory purpose,
institutional differences would not violate the Constitution even if
student choices produced a predominantly black student body at
one of the lesser colleges in the system. 43 Under these circum-
stances, institutional inequality is not an effect of either past or
present racial discrimination.
Even in a system with a history of racial discrimination, the
present effects of past inequality might become constitutionally in-
significant in the face of truly voluntary student choice. If students
have an unrestrained choice of colleges, the effect of any continu-
ing inequality might be characterized as a result of student selec-
tion and not the actions of the state. The district court on remand
offered this justification for refusing to remedy the vestiges of ine-
quality between Mississippi's black and white colleges. As previ-
ously noted, however, the standard of voluntary choice under
Fordice is a compromise between the constitutional rights of black
240. Id. at 729.
241. See supra pp. 43-46.
242. The Fordice Court did not discuss the distinct violation of inequality in separate
and unequal colleges, but its concern with continuing segregation was expressed in terms of
policies that "substantially restrict a person's choice of which institution to enter" thereby
contributing to racial identifiability. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 733. See also id. at 734-35 (admis-
sion policies restrict student choices in a way that perpetuates segregation); id. at 741 (mis-
sion designations interfere with student choice and perpetuate segregation; id. 742 (number
of institutions makes for different choices).
243. See id. at 741 ("we do not suggest that absent discriminatory purpose the assign-
ment of different missions to various institutions in a State's higher education system would
raise an equal protection issue where one or more of the institutions become or remain
predominantly black or white.").
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students and the perceived needs of the state's system of higher
education. 44 The result of that compromise does not depend on
any objective evaluation of the freedom students actually enjoy in
selecting a college.
The Fordice standard of voluntary choice is a far weaker stan-
dard than the Court has adopted in other contexts. In Teamsters
v. United States,245 for example, the Court recognized that the ra-
cial composition of an employer's work force can unlawfully deter
minority employment applicants. 46 Under Fordice, however, the
racial composition of a public college is not considered to be a rele-
vant factor in evaluating the voluntariness of student choices.247 In
the context of elementary and secondary school desegregation, the
lower federal courts embraced a more complete conception of
equality under a voluntary choice regime than is evident in
Fordice. In United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion,248 for example, the Fifth Circuit fashioned a broadly applica-
ble, voluntary choice remedial decree that required equalization of
the facilities and educational programs in black and white
schools. 2 49 The school equalization provision of the Jefferson de-
cree both encouraged desegregation through a more voluntary
choice and protected black students against separate and unequal
education in schools that remained predominantly black. 50
Fordice apparently concluded that after its limited version of
voluntary choice is available to students in the formerly de jure
segregated higher education system, then the system is desegre-
gated for constitutional purposes. If Title VI incorporates the con-
stitutional standard, and no more, then Fordice would appear to
244. See supra pp. 18-19.
245. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
246. Id. at 365; see also NLRB v. Southern Bell T&T Co., 319 U.S. 50, 57 (1943) (dis-
cussing how employer-created union restricts employee's free choice of bargaining unit after
employer domination has ceased).
247. See supra note 65.
248. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), afl'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc).
249. 372 F.2d at 899-900.
250. Bazemore v. Friday provides further support for the view that voluntary choice
does not obviate the need to remedy continuing inequality in facilities selected by black
students. In Bazemore, the Court refused to order the desegregation of racially identifiable
youth clubs relying, in part, on a factual finding that the racial imbalance resulted from
voluntary choice. 478 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring). Unlike the black public colleges in
Fordice, however, the black youth clubs in Bazemore did. not retain the continuing effects of
past inequality; services were provided to the clubs "equally regardless of their racial
makeup," Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 667 (4th Cir. 1984), and all other vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated. Id. at 697 n.15 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Thus, the continuing concentration of black youths in racially separate
clubs did not perpetuate past unequal treatment.
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prohibit an administrative remedy incorporating a more demand-
ing version of desegregation by voluntary choice. Fordice should
not, however, be read as foreclosing a Title VI remedy for the ef-
fects of unconstitutional denials of tangible equality. If, after the
Fordice standard of desegregation is met, black students are con-
centrated in colleges that remain not only racially separate but also
unequal, then continuing inequality in the education offered by
those colleges perpetuates a constitutional harm distinct from that
of racial segregation. Administrative enforcement of Title VI can,
and should, address the current discrimination resulting from the
vestiges of inequality.
Fordice did not address the inequality element of the viola-
tions resulting from separate and unequal public colleges. The ma-
jority's only allusion to the issue can be found in its rejection of
what it considered to be the private plaintiffs' claim for racially
separate but more equal colleges.251 Providing a remedy for the in-
equality element of the constitutional violation, however, is not a
reversion to the doctrine of separate but equal. A requirement that
the vestiges of past, racially based inequality be eliminated neither
compels nor condones a continuing state of racial segregation. It
does, however, demand that if black students remain concentrated
in colleges that were separate and unequal during the era of de
jure segregation, then the state must implement remedial mea-
sures sufficient to ensure that the effects of past discrimination are
not perpetuated. Administrative action under Title VI to remedy
the effects of inequality would not compel separate but equal, but
would prohibit separate and unequal.
Moreover, unlike the constitutional doctrine under Plessy, the
higher education remedy justified by the inequality aspect of the
constitutional violation would not require conversion of black pub-
251. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743. Justice Scalia rejected any remedy for tangible inequality
between black and white institutions because "it is students and not colleges that are guar-
anteed equal protection of the laws." Id. at 759 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Scalia's observation is true, but irrelevant. A remedy for inequality is not
based on an institutional claim of equal protection. The funding, facilities, faculty, educa-
tional programs, and other activities of a college determine the quality of education that is
afforded to its students. It is the effect of inequality on students that justifies the remedy.
Thus, the remedy is necessary only to the extent that a formerly de jure segregated institu-
tion's student body remains predominantly black. If a college is no longer racially identifi-
able, then the effects of inequality are not racially targeted on black students. Justice
Scalia's statement also ignores a long line of elementary and secondary cases requiring that
a remedy address the condition of school facilities. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
486 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
18 (1971). A higher education remedy for the inequality of racially identifiable schools no
more confers rights on institutions than did Swann and the cases that followed it.
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lic colleges into identical duplicates of their predominantly white
counterparts. Such actions would encourage racially based student
choices and conflict with the goals of a judicially ordered desegre-
gation remedy.252 Title VI does not compel what the Constitution
prohibits. The Title VI remedy for the continuing effects of tangi-
ble inequality should be designed to ensure that racially identifi-
able black colleges are diverse in their educational programs so
that student enrollment choices can be based on institutional char-
acteristics other than race.253 Fashioned in this way, a Title VI
remedy will not only prevent continuing discrimination against
black students enrolled in black colleges, but also encourage deseg-
regation through the enrollment of white students. By adopting a
more complete conception of the constitutional violation, adminis-
trative enforcement of Title VI could thus support and supplement
the Fordice remedy.
IV. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In the final analysis, whether Title VI embodies a conception
of racial discrimination that is coextensive with or broader than
that of the Equal Protection Clause may not be the determinative
issue. Mississippi and the other segregationist states engaged in ex-
tensive and long-lasting constitutional and statutory violations by
restricting the higher educational opportunities of their black citi-
zens to public colleges that were both racially separate and tangi-
bly unequal. To the extent that the effects of those violations re-
main, the primary issue in a higher education desegregation case is
the determination of an appropriate remedy. The nature and scope
of the remedial authority of administrative agencies acting under
Title VI, and its relationship to judicial remedial power under the
Constitution, present issues distinct from those concerning the
constitutional and statutory standards of violation. Because resolu-
tion of those issues turns, in part, on the institutional characteris-
252. Fordice identified unnecessary program duplication among black and white col-
leges as a vestige of past segregation. The Court remanded for further inquiry into the seg-
regative effect of such duplication and the feasibility of eliminating it. Fordice, 505 U.S. at
738-39.
253. For institutional characteristics other than educational program offerings, the rem-
edy for continuing inequality will be less complex. For example, each of the segregationist
states created a racially separate and unequal black land grant college in response to federal
land grant legislation. See Kujovich, supra note 22, at 40-43. One of the prominent features
of discrimination during the separate but equal era was the refusal to allocate to the black
land grants any state or federal funding for extension activities. Id. at 54-60. To the extent
that inequality in extension funding continues, it can easily be remedied by assigning black
and white land grant colleges full extension responsibilities for different areas of the state
and dividing the funding accordingly.
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tics of the body ordering the remedy, judicially and administra-
tively prescribed remedies may differ. Thus, administrative
remedies under the statute need not coincide with judicial reme-
dies under the Constitution.
When the Court in Brown II remanded the first desegregation
cases for the development of remedial decrees, it briefly outlined
the characteristics of the equitable remedial power that is the
source of judicial authority to engage in the reform of public insti-
tutions found to be in violation of the Constitution:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a prac-
tical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs.25 4
Practical flexibility and the reconciliation of the public interest
and private needs seemed essential if the judiciary was to under-
take the extraordinary remedial task of restructuring systems of
public education. Intrusion of federal courts into the operation of
public school systems required something more - and something
less - than a simple, immediate, and absolute vindication of con-
stitutional rights.
The attributes of equity and of the desegregation task make
the remedial decision a complex and indeterminate one, the resolu-
tion of which is not determined by constitutional principle. The
remedial decree is not the result of "some predetermined route
from right to remedy like railroad tracks from Bombay to
Simla, 2 5 5 but involves compromises among competing interests,
not all of which enjoy constitutional protection. The interests bal-
anced against the "private needs" of the plaintiffs in a desegrega-
tion case include not only the public interest in the control of its
schools and educational policy,256 but also a wide range of private
interests. Even the relatively circumscribed decision concerning
the busing of elementary and secondary students requires that a
trial judge consider not only the success of different busing plans
in achieving desegregation, but also the effect that different plans
may have on the educational process, the resources required to im-
plement the plans, and the likely community response to the plan
adopted. The judge's selection of a busing plan implicitly deter-
mines who will be bused and how far, who will attend neighbor-
254. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
255. Robert D. Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger
Court, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 56 (1978).
256. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 280-81 (1977).
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hood schools, who will be educated in fully desegregated schools,
and who will remain in schools with some measure of racial
identifiability.
A remedial decree in higher education also involves an implicit
balancing of interests in deciding how to reform policies that are
traceable to the de jure past and that foster continuing segrega-
tion. Modification of admissions standards, for example, not only
affects the racial profile of different institutions but also deter-
mines which students, black and white, will receive the benefits of
a state's investment in public higher education. The decision to
close a college, or to merge it into another institution, affects the
interests of students who attend the discontinued institution, the
faculty and administrators who are employed there, its past gradu-
ates, and the larger community it serves. The selection of which
institution to close or merge allocates the burdens and benefits of
the remedy among different members of the plaintiff class and
among third parties who are not represented when a court fashions
the decree. Constitutional principle does not dictate how a district
court should balance these interests and does not require a partic-
ular outcome of the balancing process.
Exercise of the judicial equity power to order desegregation
remedies also involves the courts in a variety of educational policy
decisions. This is particularly true in higher education cases.
Fordice requires that constitutionally suspect policies and prac-
tices "be reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with
sound educational practices. ' 257 The question of what is practica-
ble or educationally sound is not answered by the application of
constitutional standards. Nor is there any single answer for the va-
rious policies and practices of a higher education system. The mod-
ification of admissions standards requires a determination as to
what criteria best predict student success in higher education and
a judgment as to the purpose of higher education or of particular
institutions within a system of colleges and universities. To the ex-
tent that a desegregation decree modifies the missions of black and
white institutions,258 a district court's remedial decision will in-
volve it in the most fundamental and far-reaching aspects of
higher education policy. Mission classification is a means for state-
257. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 729.
258. Fordice found that the current mission designation of Mississippi's black and
white colleges "have as their antecedents the policies enacted to perpetuate racial separation
during the de jure segregated regime" and directed the district court to inquire on remand
"whether it would be practicable and consistent with sound educational practices" to mod-
ify the mission assignments so as to eliminate any continuing segregative effects. Id. at 740-
41.
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wide planning in higher education. By determining the role and
scope of each institution in a higher education system, mission des-
ignations involve decisions about the distribution of educational
programs, facilities, and faculty resources, as well as the allocation
of limited public funds.2 59 These determinations are quintessen-
tially ones of educational policy and politics. 260 Constitutional
principle requires that some remedy be afforded, but does not de-
termine the particular remedial choices.
In resolving the complex issues attendant upon an equitable
decree, a trial court enjoys a substantial measure of discretion.261
Because there is not a constitutionally compelled resolution of the
remedial issues, the trial judge devises the remedy based on a bal-
ancing of the public and private interests involved and considera-
tion of the educational policy issues presented. In exercising their
discretion, district judges must assume the roles of "constitutional
exegetes, political power brokers, and educational experts. ' '26 2 The
remedial decision is "constructed not through principled elabora-
tion but in the exercise of prudence and policy. '26 3
The nature of an equitable remedy in a higher education de-
segregation case suggests that the judiciary is not the best source
of remedial authority and should not be the exclusive source. The
courts' acknowledged lack of expertise in matters of educational
259. See Ayers v Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1539.
260. The character of the decisions that must be made by judges in fashioning a higher
education desegregation remedy is evident in the ruling of the Mississippi district court on
the allocation of resources between the black and white land grant institutions in Missis-
sippi. The court found that the state had engaged in a consistent and continuing pattern of
denying funds to the black land grant college, Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1463-64,
thereby making it "impossible for it to develop into a full-fledged land grant institution," id.
at 1464. The court refused, however, to order a redistribution of land grant funds for re-
search and extension work based, in part, on its judgment that it would be inefficient and
educationally unsound to fund those activities at two different colleges. Id. at 1465-66.
261. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 487 (reaffirming discretion of district courts under
traditional equitable principles in desegregation cases). Appellate review of a desegregation
remedy normally functions to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion, not
to enforce a uniform and predetermined remedial approach. Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 470-71 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 28 (1971). See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) ("In shaping equity
decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is corre-
spondingly narrow."). In Fordice, Justice Scalia was sharply critical of what he perceived to
be the "virtually standardless discretion conferred upon district judges" which would "per-
mit them to do pretty much what they please." Fordice, 505 U.S. at 762. (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
262. David L. Kirp, Legalism & Politics in School Desegregation, 1981 Wisc. L. REV.
924, 933.
263. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 28
(1983).
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policy and judicial concern about political accountability in educa-
tional decisions 2 " encourages remedial restraint and deference to
the policy decisions of the defendants - state educational authori-
ties. While that restraint and deference may be a necessary con-
comitant to the judicial remedial power, it can also impede
achievement of a complete and effective remedy. Faced with con-
flicting opinions from expert witnesses, a federal judge may hesi-
tate to reject the educational policy judgments made through a
state's political and administrative processes. Similarly, a judge
may conclude that a remedial measure, although effective in elimi-
nating the vestiges of discrimination, is not practicable in the con-
text of the judicial equity power.265
To the extent that a court does venture into the realm of edu-
cational policy, its remedial decrees will more closely resemble ad-
ministrative orders than traditional judicial remedies.266 Yet courts
lack the institutional capabilities of administrative agencies. A
court is dependent upon parties in an adversarial relationship, the
context of a particular case, and the limitations of the rules of evi-
dence to develop the factual basis for a remedy. The judicial pro-
cess functions best for the determination of historical, adjudicative
facts and not for the general or legislative fact-finding that forms
264. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489-90; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265, 404 (Opinion of Blackmun,
J.); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973); Milliken v Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
265. A court may accept an incomplete remedy for the constitutional violation because
of its hesitation to intrude on competing values and interests or its inability to undertake
the structural reform necessary for a complete remedy. "The more narrowly the court de-
fines successful implementation [of a desegregation remedy], the more possible is its
achievement: thus, the temptation to convert implementation of a systemic policy change
into a matter of compliance with a narrow judicial role." Kirp, supra note 262, at 935. In
Fordice, the Court seems to have given into that temptation. By rejecting Green's remedial
goal of "a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools," Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968), the Court avoided the complex remedial task of
desegregating colleges and universities and substituted the more modest requirement of
modifying some of the state's policies that foster continuing segregation. Fordice, 505 U.S.
at 728. In the view of some commentators, courts should more candidly acknowledge the
limits of the judicial remedial power and leave full vindication of the underlying right to
remedial action by the other branches of government. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resis-
tance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 606 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1221, 1227 (1978). Admin-
istrative enforcement of Title VI provides just such an opportunity for a more effective
higher education remedy than can be afforded by a court.
266. The administrative characteristics of complex judicial remedies are not confined to
higher education desegregation but appear in a variety of contexts involving institutional
remedies or public law injunctions. See Schuck, supra note 263, at 151-53; William A.
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy,
91 YALE L.J. 635, 644 (1982); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Forward:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 56 (1982).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the basis for educational and other policy decisions that are inci-
dent to the formulation of an equitable remedy.67 Moreover, be-
cause the parties do not represent all constituencies affected by a
remedy, the remedial options presented by the parties may neglect
legitimate, but not constitutionally protected, interests.28 The
court's insulation from interest groups and other political forces
further encourages simplification of the remedial issues and creates
a "danger of fostering reductionist solutions. '2,9
An administrative agency developing remedies for discrimina-
tion under Title VI is not restricted by the institutional limitations
of the judiciary.2 70 Administrative processes are characterized by a
flexibility lacking in judicial decisionmaking. Because it has the au-
thority to engage in Title VI rulemaking, as well as adjudication,
an agency's remedial inquiry is not limited by the case-specific ad-
versarial process. A rulemaking proceeding permits broader partic-
ipation in the development of remedial principles and the remedial
options presented to the agency are not limited to those offered by
plaintiffs, defendants, or their witnesses. Unlike judges, who, for
the most part, are generalists rather than specialists in a particular
policy area,271 an administrative agency employs a specialized staff
which preserves the agency's institutional experience and
expertise.
An agency also enjoys capabilities for information gathering
that are superior to those of the judiciary. It can consult sources of
information beyond the parties and the experts they offer. In a
rulemaking proceeding, an agency can draw upon the experience
and knowledge of educators, academic administrators, and others
without regard to the restrictions of the rules of evidence or other
constraints of the judicial process. The agency can conduct its own
studies, employ independent consultants, and receive information
from other public and private organizations.272 Administrative
fact-finding processes are thus better adapted to the exploration of
general, legislative facts and to a full examination of all facets of
the complex policy issues raised by desegregation remedies in
higher education.
Because its Title VI enforcement powers are national in scope,
267. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45-51 (1977).
268. Gewirtz, supra note 265, at 604; Fletcher, supra note 266, at 658.
269. HOROWITZ, supra note 267, at 23.
270. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941) (attainment of na-
tional policy through expert administration not confined within narrow judicial canons for
equitable relief).
271. HOROWITZ, supra note 267, at 25-26, 30-31.
272. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx. L. REV.
411, 413 (1973).
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a federal agency can develop more comprehensive and consistent
solutions to the problems raised by higher education desegregation
remedies. In a single rulemaking proceeding, or in a less formal
context, an agency can bring together higher education officials
from the formerly de jure segregated states for an exchange of
views on the successes and failures of past desegregation efforts.
Such consultations can assist an agency in determining which re-
medial techniques have little likelihood of success and which are
worthy of duplication in more than one state. In generally applica-
ble regulations incorporating remedial requirements, an agency
could ensure consistency in the remedial obligations imposed on
different state systems of higher education while at the same time
retain the flexibility to take account of each system's unique
characteristics.
In addition, an agency, unlike a district court, can better in-
form itself about, and develop remedial solutions to, impediments
to desegregation that cross state lines and that influence more than
one system of higher education. For example, the severe national
shortage of black academics with advanced degrees273 prevents
faculty desegregation at white public colleges which, in turn, im-
pedes student desegregation at those institutions.274 The district
court in Fordice found that "Mississippi, together with all prior de
jure segregated states, has to some degree affected the qualified
pool of black applicants for faculty positions, 2 75 but nevertheless
concluded that the state's white institutions could not be held re-
sponsible for the general shortage of black faculty. 6 Conse-
quently, the court adopted no remedial measures directed to
faculty desegregation. A federal agency with a broader enforcement
jurisdiction than that of a district court might adopt comprehen-
sive solutions to the problem of faculty desegregation. It could, for
example, develop techniques for interstate cooperation in coun-
tering the effects that past discrimination has on the pool of black
academics. This might include multi-state agreements that expand
existing programs in which white public colleges provide funding
for the advanced education of black students in exchange for a
commitment to teach at the funding institution upon gradua-
tion.277 Such agreements could influence the career choices of black
students by providing them with a broader range of institutional
273. See SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, supra note 92, at 39-41; Ayers v. Fordice,
879 F. Supp. at 1461.
274. See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1462-63, 1471.
275. Id. at 1462 (emphasis omitted).
276. Id. at 1463.
277. See id. at 1462.
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choices in pursuing advanced degrees and opportunities in more
than one state for employment at a white public college after grad-
uation. A regulatory regime of Title VI remedies that recognizes
not only the desegregative effect that results from the hiring of a
black faculty member at a white public college, but also the contri-
butions of the states providing the funding and the educational op-
portunity could induce more progress toward reducing the black
faculty shortage than the current state-by-state approach. A fed-
eral agency could encourage similar interstate cooperation in the
exchange of faculty between black and white public colleges.
The statutory framework for Title VI enforcement establishes
an additional distinction between the judiciary's equitable reme-
dial power and administrative remedial power under the statute.
Section 602 requires presidential approval of regulations issued to
enforce section 601's prohibition against discrimination. Moreover,
agency decisions to terminate federal funding, made after an op-
portunity for an administrative hearing, do not become effective
until the agency has filed a written report on the grounds for its
action with the relevant committees of the House and Senate. 78
Consequently, administrative creation and enforcement of reme-
dies for desegregation in higher education have an element of po-
litical accountability and embody a political consensus that are ab-
sent from the remedial orders of a federal district judge. While the
insulation from political accountability that characterizes the fed-
eral judiciary is an important element of judicial legitimacy in the
elaboration of constitutional rights, it is much less of an asset when
a court formulates an equitable remedy for the reform of social
institutions. 27 The decision, for example, of which higher educa-
tion remedial measures are practicable or educationally sound,
does not call for the principled elaboration of legal standards, but
for determinations of politics and policy - determinations more
suitable for an administrative agency than a court.2 s8
Because of the political accountability and broad participation
in rulemaking that characterize the Title VI regulatory process, an
agency is more likely than a court to consider and take account of
the wide variety of interests that are not constitutionally pro-
278. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988). The committees to which the required report must be
submitted are those "having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved."
Id.
279. See SCHUCK, supra note 263, at 178 ("What a court can legitimately and effectively
do in reforming social structure is limited by the same functional attributes of the judicial
process that legitimate the judicial derivation of substantive rights.").
280. See Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (stating that policy judgments are to be made by administrative agencies, not courts).
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tected, but that are nevertheless affected by a higher education
remedy. Consequently, an agency may strike a different balance
among the affected interests and make policy choices different
from those of a court acting within the confines of the equitable
remedial power, the judicial process, and an appreciation for the
limits of judicial power. Where a district court might give substan-
tial weight to a policy favoring selective admissions standards, an
administrative agency may weigh more heavily a policy protecting
the educational opportunities of black students. Neither policy
choice is constitutionally compelled; both involve an exercise of re-
medial discretion in balancing the affected interests. For the broad
range of remedial choices that are not determined by constitu-
tional or other legal principles, the choices made by an administra-
tive agency are as legitimate as those made by a district court.2 81
Moreover, a federal agency developing desegregation remedies
has the flexibility to include in its remedial calculus other policies
adopted by Congress and the Executive Branch that bear on the
choice of remedy even if they do not compel a particular desegre-
gation remedy. For example, Congress has found that "Black col-
leges and universities have contributed significantly to the effort to
attain equal opportunity through postsecondary education for
Black, low-income, and educationally disadvantaged Ameri-
cans." 2 2 Thus, it has adopted the policy of enhancing those insti-
tutions283 "to ensure their continuation and participation in fulfil-
ling the Federal mission of equality of educational opportunity. '28 4
Similarly, Presidents of both political parties have issued Execu-
tive Orders calling for the strengthening of black colleges through
increased awards of federal funds. 85 These legislative and execu-
tive policies are directly relevant to the question of whether insti-
tutional closure should be adopted as a desegregation remedy and,
if so, whether black colleges should be selected for extinction.
The agreement of the political branches of the federal govern-
281. See Kirp, supra note 262, at 957 ("There exists no single right answer to questions
of educational policy. Choosing a 'best' solution is largely a matter of strategy, and there is
no particular reason to think that the courts have some special competence in this realm.");
see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 747-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(favoring administrative, rather than judicial, intrusion into college admissions standards).
282. 20 U.S.C. § 1060(1) (1988).
283. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1060(3) - 1060(4).
284. 20 U.S.C. § 1060(3).
285. Exec. Order No. 12,232, 3. C.F.R. 274 (1980) (President Carter); Exec. Order No.
12,320, 3 C.F.R. 176 (1981), reprinted in 20 U.S.C. § 1051 (Supp. V 1976) (President Rea-
gan); Exec. Order No. 12,677, 3 C.F.R. 22 (1989), reprinted in 20 U.S.C. § 1060 (Supp. II
1990) (President Bush); Exec. Order No. 12,876, 3 C.F.R. 671 (1993), reprinted in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1060 (Supp. V 1988) (President Clinton).
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ment that black colleges should be preserved and strengthened be-
cause of their contribution to equal educational opportunity, in
combination with the distinctive characteristics of the administra-
tive process, would influence other remedial choices made by a fed-
eral administrative agency. The district court in Fordice, for exam-
ple, declined to order enhancement of Mississippi Valley State
University because the evidence in the case did "not persuade the
court that merely adding programs and increasing budgets [would]
desegregate" a black institution.2 86 With its broader information-
gathering powers and its consideration of desegregation remedies
in more than one state, an administrative agency might reach a
different conclusion about the desegregative potential of enhancing
black colleges. Moreover, in light of federal policies recognizing the
role of black colleges and favoring their preservation, an agency's
judgment concerning the use of institutional enhancement would
be informed not only by the likelihood of success, but also the con-
sequences of failure. The remedial choice made by the district
court in Fordice leaves black students in an institution that con-
tinues to suffer the effects of past discrimination. An administra-
tive decision to use the remedial technique of black college en-
hancement could produce some measure of desegregation and at
the same time ensure that black students are not left to the fate of
a separate and unequal education.
The more flexible administrative process is also better suited
to the monitoring of desegregation remedies over the extended pe-
riod during which progress must be measured. An administrative
agency can initiate investigations, conduct periodic on-site inspec-
tions, and evaluate the consequences of its remedial decisions.
Based on an agency's monitoring of all states over which it has
enforcement jurisdiction, the agency can modify its remedial ap-
proach in response to changed circumstances or new information
on the impact of its desegregation remedies. Because it has the
power to initiate action, an agency's monitoring and continuing en-
forcement activities do not depend upon the resources or litigation
strategy of the parties to a lawsuit.
Finally, administrative remedies under Title VI are, in one im-
portant respect, less intrusive than judicial orders. The administra-
tive enforcement authority of Title VI depends upon the receipt of
federal funding by a state system of higher education.2 s7 State edu-
cational authorities thus have a measure of choice in their compli-
286. Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. at 1491.
287. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination only in a "program or activity"
receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Under section 606, the term "program
or activity" includes a public system of higher education. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(2)(A) (1988).
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ance with Title VI remedies that is not available for judicially com-
pelled, constitutional remedies. A state system can avoid the future
application of conditions imposed under Title VI by refusing fed-
eral funding.288 If a state higher education system withdraws from
federal funding of its programs, its remedial obligation is limited to
that imposed by a court under the Constitution.
Because the institutional characteristics that limit the judici-
ary in developing complex remedies for pervasive discrimination
do not apply to administrative agencies, the administrative reme-
dial power should not be confined to that exercised by the courts.
While Fordice may determine the limited reach of the judiciary's
equitable remedial power under the Constitution, it does not de-
fine the scope of administrative remedial authority under Title VI.
The statute itself supports an administrative remedial authority
distinct from the judicial remedial power. Congress vested primary
authority to enforce the statute in federal agencies, and not in the
courts. Thus, section 602 directs federal agencies to issue regula-
tions that will effectuate the discrimination prohibition of section
601.289 It further authorizes those agencies to secure compliance
with any requirement adopted pursuant to section 602.290 In the
Title VI enforcement scheme, agencies have been given broad dis-
cretionary authority while the courts have been assigned the pri-
mary role of reviewing administrative actions. A substantial mea-
sure of deference normally applies to judicial review of actions by
administrative agencies, and nothing in Title VI suggests a devia-
tion from this standard practice.291
Moreover, the judicial deference shown to decisions of admin-
istrative agencies is "particularly important when a court is asked
to review an agency's fashioning of discretionary relief. In this
area, agency determinations frequently rest upon a complex and
hard-to-review mix of considerations. ' 29 2 Where, as in Title VI,
Congress has vested in an agency the authority to select the means
of achieving statutory policy, judicial review is conducted in accord
with the "fundamental principle" that "'the relation of remedy to
policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.' "293
288. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 596-99 (1983).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
290. Id.
291. Section 603 provides for judicial review of agency action under Title VI "as may
otherwise be provided by law for similar action taken by such department or agency on
other grounds." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1988). The statute's only exception to the normal pro-
cedures for judicial review is its express provision for review of fund termination decisions,
even if such decisions would not be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
292. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966).
293. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973) (quoting American
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Thus, in reviewing administrative remedies, a court "must guard
against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow con-
fines of law into the more spacious domain of policy. '294 The
agency "has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not in-
terfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable rela-
tion to the unlawful practices found to exist."295
V. CONCLUSION
Forty years after Brown, the persistence of segregation and in-
equality in public higher education presents a continuing challenge
to this Nation's promise of racial equality. Fulfillment of that
promise is not, and should not be, within the exclusive domain of
the Judicial Branch. Confronted with the formidable task of purg-
ing the effects of institutionalized discrimination from public sys-
tems of higher education, the Fordice Court defined a modest role
for the judiciary. Rather than reforming the institutions that em-
body and perpetuate the harms of the past, the Supreme Court
elected to remedy only a carefully circumscribed set of policies and
practices. In place of a systemic conception of desegregation,
Fordice substituted a remedial goal that accepts a continuing state
of racial duality in colleges and universities. As much as any case
decided in recent years, Fordice exemplifies the limits of the judi-
cial power in affording a complete and effective remedy for more
than a century of the most extreme forms of racial discrimination.
The limits of the judicial power, however, do not determine
the limits of national power. In Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress exercised its full authority under the Spending
Clause to ensure that the revenues collected from all the people are
not used to the disadvantage of some of the people. Through a
broad and unqualified prohibition against racial discrimination in
federally-funded programs, Congress provided an added measure
of protection against the perpetuation of the legacy of inequality.
And in delegating to federal agencies the power to effectuate the
national policy expressed in Title VI, Congress enlisted the power
of the Executive Branch to ensure that judicial remedies would not
be the only remedies for racial discrimination.
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946)).
294. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
295. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946). The principle of judicial defer-
ence applies as much, if not more, in the context of rulemaking. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 184-91 (1991) (Department of Health and Human Services regulations); Chevron
U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (Environmental
Protection Agency regulations); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
371-72 (1973) (Federal Reserve Board regulation).
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The existence of two partially overlapping sources of remedial
power in two different branches of the federal government presents
the issue of how the two powers can be reconciled in practice. The
issue is not a novel one and there is precedent for its resolution. In
elementary and secondary school cases, the lower courts recognized
that desegregation remedies implicated a variety of policy and ad-
ministrative questions that were better resolved by the agencies of
the Executive Branch than the judiciary." 6 While retaining the ul-
timate authority to determine what constituted an effective rem-
edy for constitutional violations,297 they adopted the practice of re-
quiring substantial reliance on Title VI desegregation guidelines
issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 298
Subsequently, and to comply with Green's mandate for prompt ac-
299tion, cooperation between the Judicial and Executive Branches
was furthered by court orders that school districts first submit
their desegregation plans to HEW for advice, recommendations,
and review - a practice found acceptable by the Supreme
Court.s00
296. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 852-61 (5th
Cir. 1966); Price v. Dennison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (5th Cir.
1965); Whittenberg v. Greenville County Sch. Dist., 298 F. Supp. 784, 790 (D.S.C. 1969).
297. E.g., Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 355 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir.
1966); Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 19 (8th Cir. 1965).
298. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 861 (discussing the policy of "encour-
aging the maximum legally permissible correlation between judicial standards for school de-
segregation and HEW Guidelines."); Singleton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Jackson Sch.
Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) (noting the "great weight" attached to administrative
standards); Kemp, 352 F.2d at 18 (agreeing that administrative standards "must be heavily
relied upon to determine what desegregation plans effectively eliminate discrimination").
HEW has also issued guidelines for desegregation in higher education. Revised Criteria
Specifying the Ingredients of Acceptable Plans to Desegregate State Systems of Public
Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 6658 (1978) [hereinafter Revised Criteria]. The Department
of Education, successor to HEW's enforcement responsibilities with regard to education,
recently reaffirmed the policies contained in the Revised Criteria. Notice of Application of
Supreme Court Decision, 59 Fed. Reg. 4271, 4272 (1994). The federal courts, however, have
not looked to the Revised Criteria as the benchmark of an effective remedy. In the Louisi-
ana case, the federal district court concluded that the Revised Criteria were intended to
apply only to voluntary compliance and not to litigation. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F.
Supp. 525, 529 (E.D. La. 1989). The first district judge to consider the Alabama case or-
dered the defendants to submit a remedial plan based on the Revised Criteria, United
States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1173 (N.D. Ala. 1985), but the court's finding of
liability was later reversed and remanded, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987). The district judge
who was subsequently assigned to the case did not rely on the Revised Criteria in develop-
ing a remedy. Knight v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1377-82 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
299. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1967).
300. Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 21 (1969); Davis v. Board of Sch.
Commn'rs, 414 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of
Educ., 417 F.2d 838, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1969); Conley v. Lake Charles Sch. Bd., 303 F. Supp.
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The Court has developed a similar approach to reconciling the
potentially conflicting administrative and judicial roles in voting
rights cases. Under section five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
certain changes in voting procedures, including reapportionments,
are not effective until submitted to the United States Attorney
General for an administrative determination that the change does
not violate the Act. 01 In cases in which a federal court has found
an existing apportionment to be unconstitutional, the requirement
of administrative "preclearance" of a reapportionment plan could
conflict with a district court's power to adopt a remedy for the con-
stitutional violation. The Supreme Court resolved this potential
conflict by stipulating the sequence of administrative and judicial
determinations: voting changes must be submitted to the Attorney
General before a judicial determination on the constitutionality of
the change.302 While the voting rights context differs from that of
Title VI,303 the same sequence of administrative and judicial action
could be effected by a court in the exercise of its remedial
discretion.0 4
394, 399 (W.D. La. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 434 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1970); Whit-
tenberg, 298 F. Supp at 790-91.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). The Act also provides for a declaratory judgment action
to secure judicial approval of a voting change, as an alternative to submission to the Attor-
ney General. Id. The preclearance requirement of section five applies to reapportionments.
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533-35 (1973).
302. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981). McDaniel drew a distinction between
reapportionment plans submitted for a court's approval after a judicial determination that
the existing apportionment was unconstitutional and plans actually fashioned by a court.
See id. at 146-53. The Court held that Congress did not intend that the latter be submitted
to the Attorney General for § 5 preclearance. Id. at 148-49. Thus, a voting change devised by
a court is essentially deemed to be compliance with § 5. Congress has imposed a similar
limitation on administrative enforcement of Title VI by stipulating that compliance with a
desegregation order of a federal court "shall be deemed compliance with [Title VI], insofar
as the matters covered in the order or judgment are concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (1988).
This provision, however, is limited to desegregation by a "local education agency" and does
not cover state systems of higher education or other state and local governmental units. See
id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(2) (1988) (distinguishing "local education agency" and
"public system of higher education").
303. The most important distinction is that Title VI does not require an administrative
determination of compliance with the statute prior to a judicial decision on the constitution-
ality of a desegregation plan. Thus, referral for administrative action on a plan that is before
a court would depend on the exercise of the court's discretion, as was done in many of the
elementary and secondary cases.
304. The proper sequence of administrative and judicial action is particularly impor-
tant in the absence of Title VI regulations defining the scope of the statutory violation.
When the statutory and constitutional standards of violation are coextensive, administrative
ordering of a remedy after a court has fashioned a constitutional remedy would, in effect,
constitute impermissible agency review of judicial action. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 270 F. Supp. 859, 866 (M.D. Ala. 1967) ("There can be no administrative supervision
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An effective relationship between courts and executive agen-
cies in achieving the constitutional and statutory goal of racial
equality in educational opportunity depends upon the sensitivity
of each Branch to the powers and institutional capabilities of the
other. It also requires that federal agencies not abdicate their re-
sponsibility to shape and enforce the national policy prohibiting
discrimination in federally funded programs, a responsibility too
frequently neglected in the past.30 5 The time has come for the Ex-
ecutive Branch to exercise the full measure of its enforcement
powers under Title VI. This requires a regulatory regime, approved
by the President, that defines the scope and nature of unlawful
discrimination in segregated systems of higher education and that
establishes the remedial steps such systems must undertake to
maintain their eligibility for federal funding. As Fordice makes all
too clear, there is no viable alternative.
or review of a judicial decree."). If the Title VI violation has been extended by regulations,
then agency enforcement action after a court has ordered a constitutional remedy should
not be barred, at least to the extent that the administrative remedy supplements the judi-
cial remedy rather than displacing or conflicting with it. See Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 69-
73 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that Attorney General's objection to voting change previously
held constitutional by a court does not necessarily conflict with judicial decision in light of
difference between Voting Rights Act and constitutional standards of violation).
305. In 1973, a federal district court found that the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare had neglected its responsibility to enforce Title VI. See Adams v. Richardson,
351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1973). Over the next two decades, the district court issued a vari-
ety of orders designed to ensure that HEW and the Department of Education carried out
the policies established in Title VI and related statutes. For a history of this lengthy litiga-
tion, see Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 879 F.2d 880, 881-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
aff'd, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 163-64 (D.C. Cir.
1983). Acting under the constraints of the orders issued in the Adams cases, HEW and the
Department of Education found that several state systems of higher education were not in
compliance with Title VI. However, most of these cases were settled under desegregation
plans that either did not meet the administrative remedial guidelines or that were not fully
implemented. See, e.g., Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 204-09 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wright, J.,
dissenting) (North Carolina plan did not comply with remedial guidelines); Adams v. Ben-
nett, 675 F. Supp. 668, 674 (D.D.C. 1987) (ordering Department of Education to require that
additional plans be submitted from four defaulting states). After the decision in Fordice, the
Department of Education reaffirmed its Title VI enforcement authority, but adopted a pas-
sive posture by promising to "take appropriate action" if it received information indicating
that a state has not complied with the Department's higher education desegregation poli-
cies. Notice of Application of Supreme Court Decision, 59 Fed. Reg. 4271, 4272 (1994).

